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ABSTRACT
This Article addresses the tax consequences to AIG Financial
employees who repay their controversial retention bonuses in the year of
receipt (Year 1) or in a subsequent year (Year 2). At the time the
executives received their bonuses, the media and members of Congress
raised challenges that might induce such repayment, thus justifying
favorable tax treatment for repaying executives. Accordingly, bonuses
repaid in year I should be excluded from gross income under the doctrine
of Year 1 rescission. Bonuses repaid in Year 2 should result in an
adjustment under Section 1341, which reduces the income taxes for Year 2
by the amount that the income taxes for Year I would have been reduced if
the repaid bonus hypothetically had been excluded from income in Year 1.
This analysis is based upon a "balancing-entry approach" which
backs out a Year 1 transaction when an assumption at the time of Year 1
receipt (that the employee would get to keep the bonus) later turns out to
have been in error. This balancing-entry approach is traced across a
number of case law and statutory doctrines including the claim of right
doctrine, the Crane-Tufts doctrine, and rescission and cancellation in
Year 1. Contrary interpretations exist, however, manifesting the need for
Congressional or administrative clarification so as to encourage
repayments of such controversial bonuses.
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TAX TARP NEEDED FOR RETURNED BONUS
INTRODUCTION
American Insurance Group (AIG), after receiving more than $170
billion in taxpayer bailout money under the Treasury's Troubled Assets
Relief Program1 (TARP), paid $165 million in "retention" bonuses to 418
executives of its Financial Products Unit on March 15, 2009.2 This unit
had created "the exotic derivatives that caused AIG's near-collapse and
started the government rescue to avoid a global financial crisis." 3 Just
months earlier, in December 2008, AIG paid $55 million in such retention
bonuses.4
Shortly after news of the March AIG bonuses broke, Congress "shot
1. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 106, 122
Stat. 3765 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5216).
2. Martin Crutsinger, AIG Execs Get $165M in Bonuses; U.S. Unable to Bar
Payments Despite $170 Bil. Bailout of Troubled Insurer, CHI. SuN-TIMES, Mar. 15, 2009,
at A20. The Emergency Economic Stabalization Act provides that in certain direct
Treasury purchases of troubled assets from an individual financial institution where the
Treasury received a meaningful equity or debt position in the financial institution, the
Treasury was to require that the financial institution meet "appropriate standards for
executive compensation." § 1ll(b)(1) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5221). After
enactment, lo and behold, the Treasury made direct investments rather than direct
purchases of troubled assets. Compare Andrew Dowell & Jamie Heller, U.S. Slates $22
Billion for Insurers from TARP, Wall St. J., May 15, 2009, at Al (discussing Treasury
life insurance bailout under the capital purchase program where life insurers received
funds through selling preferred stock to the government) with Greg Hitt & Deborah
Solomon, Historic Bailout Passes As Economy Slips Further, WALL ST. J., Oct. 3, 2008,
at Al (discussing $700 billion bailout formed prior to EESA and signed into law Oct. 4,
2008, and claiming that "[t]he Treasury Department is expected to ... start buying
distressed assets") (emphasis added).
3. Congress: Give Back AIG Bonus or Else, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis, MN), Mar.
18, 2009, at Al.
4. See Christopher Keating, AIG Bonuses Actually $218 Million; Blumenthal's
Math, HARTFORD COURANT (Conn.), Mar. 22, 2009, at Al; see also Edmund L. Andrews
& Peter Baker, Bonus Money at Troubled A.LG. Draws Heavy Criticism, N.Y.TIMES
ONLINE, Mar. 16, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/16/business/16aig.html?_- r= 1.
About $55 million of "$220 million in retention pay for 400 employees for 2008" was
paid in December 2008, the remaining $165 million was paid in March 2009. Id.
According to AIG CEO Edward Liddy, the December bonuses were paid because the
executives had finished closing down the types of transactions for which they were hired
and left by December. American International Group's Impact on the Global Economy:
Before, During, and After the Federal Intervention: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on
Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises of the H. Comm. on
Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 73, 77-78, 92, 560-61 (2009) [hereinafter House AIG Hearing]
(statement of Edward Liddy, CEO, AIG).
2010]
326 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 1:323
across the bow of the AIG executives," 5 sending a message-give back the
bonuses or Congress would take them back one way or another.
6
Contemporaneously, AIG CEO Edward Liddy asked the employees of
AIG's Financial Products Unit, who received retention payments in excess
of $100,000, "to step up and do the right thing" by returning at least half
of those payments.7 Thereafter some AIG executives, under pressure from
New York Attorney General Andrew Cuomo,8 Congress, and AIG CEO
Liddy, pledged to return $50 million of the $165 million in AIG retention
5. 155 Cong. Rec. H4253, 4265 (daily ed. Apr. 1, 2009) (remarks of Rep. Ed
Perlmutter, D-Col. who noted that consequently, "they are returning some of the
money").
6. 155 Cong. Rec. H3643, 3656 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 2009) (remarks of Charley
Rangel, H. Ways & Means Chair, D-N.Y.) ("[T]his [90% tax on unreturned bonus] will
be a message that will be sent in a bipartisan way.... [W]e are saying to the IRS and to the
commissioner that we really want to make certain that, at the end of the day, they're not
the ones that caused the problem and then get rewarded for it."); 155 Cong. Rec. H4253,
4267 (daily ed. Apr. 1, 2009) (remarks of Rep. Virginia Foxx, R-N.C.) (prohibiting bo-
nuses and compensation not based on performance by TARP beneficiaries retroactive to
2008); News Release, S. Comm. on Finance, Bacus, Grassley, Wyden, Snowe Introduce
The Compensation Fairness Act of 2009 (Mar. 19, 2009) available at http://finance.
senate.gov/press/Bpress/2009press/prb031909a.pdf [hereinafter News Release] ("Com-
pensation Fairness Act of 2009, legislation to discourage excessive compensation by
companies that have taken taxpayer funds, and recoup payments made to executives at
recipient institutions of funds from the Troubled Assets Relief program (TARP). For
companies that received TARP funds, the legislation would impose a 35 percent excise
tax on both employers and employees, on retention bonuses and other bonuses.").
7. House AIG Hearing, supra note 4, at 54 ("The payment of large bonuses to
people in the very unit that caused so much of AIG's financial trouble does not sit well
with the American taxpayer in any way, shape, or form. And for a good reason.
Accordingly, this morning, I have asked the employees of AIG Financial Products to step
up and do the right thing. Specifically, I have asked those who received retention
payments in excess of $100,000 or more to return at least half of those payments. Some
have already stepped forward and offered to give up 100 percent of their payments.")
(statement of Edward Liddy, CEO, AIG); see also Mary Williams Walsh & David M.
Herszenhorn, A.LG Seeking Return of Half of Its Bonuses, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2009, at
Al (noting Mr. Liddy's request).
8. New York State's Attorney General announced "commitments" from nine of the
top ten bonus recipients at the AIG group to give the retention bonus money back,
totaling $50 million out of the total $165 million awarded in March 2009. Mary Williams
Walsh & Carl Hulse, A.LG Bonuses Of $50 Million To Be Repaid, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24,
2009, at Al; see also Andrew Clark, Fear of Bonus Outrage Forces AIG Staff to Quit: 20
Employees Leave Citing Public Harassment: Workers at Mayfair Division Join Exodus,
GUARDIAN (London), Apr. 14, 2009, at 26 ("New York's [A]ttorney [G]eneral, Andrew
Cuomo, is investigating the legality of the payouts. Faced with widespread condemnation
and the possibility of being publicly named, 15 of the top 20 recipients agreed to return
their money.").
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bonuses paid March 15, 2009. 9 On March 18, 2009, CEO Liddy expressly
testified before the House Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance, and
Government Sponsored Enterprise that, due to pressure from the above
sources and public outrage, he had requested the return of all or part of
bonuses just paid to executives of AIG's Financial Products Unit.10 Liddy
assured various members of the Subcommittee that he would supply for the
record the number of AIG executives who agreed to give back all or some
of the bonuses; however, he has not done so.'
Fast forward to October 22, 2009-the Treasury sent to the CEO of
AIG12 a letter containing the Special Master determination on compensation
for 2009 as to senior executives and the most highly compensated
employees of a TARP funded company. 13 The letter proposed special
treatment for the senior executives and most highly compensated employees
of the Financial Products Unit.14 The Special Master for TARP Executive
9. Walsh & Hulse, supra note 8, at Al.
10. House AIG Hearing, supra note 4, at 54 ("[Wle have heard the American people
loudly and clearly these past few days. The payment of large bonuses to people in the
very unit that caused so much of AIG's financial trouble does not sit well with the
American taxpayer in any way, shape, or form.... The action we are taking today is a
result of discussions with numerous parties, many of you [Members of Congress],
including Attorney General Cuomo of New York.") (statement of Edward Liddy, CEO,
AG); id. at 78 ("[I]n response to the public outrage, in response to the suggestions of
many folks that I met with yesterday, just listening to the President of the United States
say, we need to do something, we have attempted to amend this situation, and we have
asked the people at AG FP to demonstrate their leadership and give it back.") (statement
of Edward Liddy, CEO, AMG).
11. Id. at 324 ("AG FP continues to receive responses from its employees and cannot
provide a final number pending the resolution of certain tax implications and administrative
details posed by return of the retention payments. Although published reports have pur-
ported to establish the amount of the retention payments committed to be returned, the final
figure, in fact, has not been established. AIG is committed to providing Members of
Congress with this information as soon as practicable. While AG is disappointed with the
level of resignations from AIG FP, the company is gratified by the response of many to its
request to return at least a portion of the retention payments.").
12. As of August 10, 2009, Robert Benmoshe became the CEO of AIG, superseding
Edward Liddy whose post was meant to be temporary. See Liam Pleven, Joann S. Lublin
& Leslie Scism, AIG Selects Ex-Chief of MetLife As CEO: Benmosche Will Infuse the
Insurer With IPO, Deal Experience; Test of Government's Pay, WALL ST. J., Aug. 4,
2009, at C 1, available at http://online.wsj.comarticle/SB 124931167159301597.html.
13. Letter from Kenneth R. Feinberg, Office of the Special Master TARP Executive
Compensation to President and CEO of AIG, Re: Proposed Compensation Payments and
Structure for Senior Executive Officers and Most Highly Compensated Employees, at 1-2,
Al1-12, available at http://www.treas.gov/presslreleases/docs20091022%20AG%2OLett
er.pdf [hereinafter Letter].
14. Neither the Letter nor the applicable regulation, 31 C.F.R. § 30.0 (2009) (Exec-
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Compensation determined that 2009 compensation for AIG's covered
employees had to comport with the following standards:
1. Base salary paid in cash should not exceed $500,000 except for good
cause specifically excluding from such good cause exception any
employee with existing substantial retention payment contracts.
2. The majority of base compensation should be paid in immediately vested
[phantom] stock units reflecting the value of a "basket" of four AIG
insurance subsidiaries, which are redeemable in three annual installments
beginning two years after they are earned.'
5
An employee meeting objective performance metrics may be eligible for
restricted stock vested only if the employee stays with AIG for three years
after the grant and redeemable in 25% installments for each 25% of TARP
obligations repaid. 16 Employees of AIG's Financial Products Unit will
receive only cash base salaries for the last two months of 2009 because their
Unit contributed significantly to the deterioration of AIG's financial
health. 17 Financial Products Unit employees who have not repaid the entire
amount of bonus pledged to be returned to AIG were limited going forward,
as of November 1, 2009, to continuation of cash salaries in effect on
December 31, 2008.18 This Article addresses the potential tax consequences
utive compensation and corporate governance), or the statute, Pub. L. No. 111-5, div. B tit.
VII, 123 Stat. 515 (2009) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5221), define "highly compensated
employee."
15. Letter, supra note 13, at 1-2.
16. Id. at 2.
17. Id. at A12. This action appears based on the factor of "employee contribution to
TARP recipient value." Id. at A4; see 31 C.F.R. § 30.16(b)(1)(vi); see also Pub. L. No.
111-5, div. B tit. VII, 123 Stat. 516 (2009) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5221(b)(3))
("Limits on compensation that exclude incentives for senior executive officers of the
TARP recipient to take unnecessary and excessive risks that threaten the value of such
recipient during the period in which any obligation arising from financial assistance prov-
ided under the TARP remains outstanding.") (emphasis added).
18. Letter, supra note 13, at A12. The regulations do not speak to such unpaid pledges.
Nor does div. B tit. VII, 123 Stat. 516 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5221), but it does call
for a claw back "of any bonus, retention award, or incentive compensation paid to a
senior executive officer and any of the next 20 most highly-compensated employees of
the TARP recipient based on statements of earnings, revenues, gains, or other criteria that
are later found to be materially inaccurate." Id. at (b)(3)(B). This may pose a problem of
statutory construction. Congress' express provision of a "claw back" of executive comp-
ensation in one provision (restatement of earnings) evidences that it did not intend a claw
back in the case of failure to honor a pledge to payback bonuses. See Touche Ross & Co. v.
Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 571-72 (1979) (finding that the important factor in determining
Congressional intent and whether Congress intended to create a private right of action is
whether Congress enacted express private civil remedies in other sections of the legislation
at issue).
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of AIG Financial Products employees who repay their bonuses.
It appears that eight covered employees were to receive no stock salary or long-term
stock. Their base salaries ranged from $100,000 to $450,000. Letter, supra note 13, at El.
It also appears that five covered employees of the Financial Products Unit had made such
pledges to return bonuses with four failing to honor the pledge. The remaining covered
employees of this Unit have made no pledge. Id. at A7. In March 2009, as many as 80
Financial Products Unit employees received retention bonuses. House AIG Hearing, supra
note 4, at 43, 71.
Mr. MANZULLO. The top 7 people at the organization received more
than $4 million in retention bonuses, and the top individual got $6.4
million, and 73 employees got a total of $1 million each. Were these
being considered to be key players, key figures in the corporation?
Mr. LIDDY. Not within the corporation, but within the unit known as
AIG FP, so just to be clear, the top people in the corporation are getting
no bonuses.
Mr. MANZULLO. But that's the group that went sour, isn't it, the
Financial Services Division?
Mr. LIDDY. Yes. And they would be some of the top people in AIG.
Id. at 71. At the time of the Hearing it was reported that from nine to fifteen employees
had made pledges and many left. See supra note 8.
Only about $19 million [of about $50 million pledged] has been given
back.... Some of the employees who had offered to return their bonuses
have instead left the company, taking their cash with them. Others
remain at Financial Products but are also holding on to their money
until they see what Kenneth R. Feinberg ... decides about whether they
should get future bonus payments they have also been promised.
Brady Dennis, AIG Executives' Promises To Return Bonuses Have Gone Largely
Unfulfilled, WASH. POST, Dec. 23, 2009.
Feinberg had ruled that a dozen of AIG's 25 highest-paid executives
would have their 2009 income slashed by 91 percent and that salaries
could not exceed $500,000 without 'good cause.' About half of the
executives on this list came from AIG Financial Products, the vilified
trading division that had written the disastrous credit-default swaps that
brought the civilized world to the brink and forced taxpayers to extend
$182 billion (and counting) in financial support for the firm.
Benmosche was deeply angry over Feinberg's decision to limit his exe-
cutives' pay. But his traders were even angrier. Though the government
had saved their company from imploding last September, they saw
themselves as victims, scapegoats-and they were ready to fight back,
departing en masse on March 16, 2010, the day after the contracts are
due to be paid, if their demands [are not] met.
Gabriel Sherman, Show Me the Money: Who Decides What a Trader is Worth, N.Y.
MAG., Nov. 30, 2009, http://nymag.com/nes/business/62559.
Yet, as of March 23, 2010, "nearly 85 percent [of the 104 senior executives whose
pay was set by the federal pay regulator] are still with the companies even though their
pay was drastically cut back" Eric Dash, Pay Limits Caused Few to Quit Jobs, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 23, 2010, atB1.
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On March 26, 2009, a Wall Street Journal blog' 9 called any AIG exec-
utive who did the "right thing"20 by giving his retention bonus back to AIG
in 2009 a "[s]ucker" because: (1) the repaid bonus could not be excluded
from gross income because the executive was entitled to, and actually
received, the bonus,2 1 an "absolute" right; 22 and (2) the repayment would
not be deductible23 at all under the Alternative Minimum Tax,24 thus
resulting in that returned bonus, in effect, being taxed at 26, or more likely,
28%,25 and still being subject to the Medicare tax. 26 Even a deduction for
19. James Taranto, Opinion, Give Back That Bonus! Oh, and By the Way, You Still
Owe Taxes on It, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, Mar. 26, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB 123807922595548325.html. This blog relied upon Richard Belzer, The AIG Bonuses,
Part 4: Return Your Bonus? Pay More in Income Taxes, Neutral Source Blog (Mar. 25,
2009), http://www.neutralsource.org/content/blog/list__posts/month/200903/. Both of
these blogs were relied upon by Catherine Rampell, Returned Bonuses May Still Be
Taxable, N.Y. Times Economix Blog (Mar. 27, 2009), http://economix/blogs/nytimes/
corn2009/03/27/retumed-bonuses-may-still-be-taxable/.
20. See supra note 7.
21. Rampell, supra note 19. Rampell analyzed inclusion of bonuses in gross income
in terms of constructive receipt. Here, the executives actually received the bonuses; the
issue is whether at the time of receipt there was sufficient political opposition to the
payment that inclusion in income was implicitly subject to a condition subsequent or
premise that such pressure would not induce repayment, so that the right to such bonus
was only apparent. Id.
22. To the contrary, where within the same tax year the payor and payee agree that
the payee will receive a lesser amount, the payee does not have an absolute right to the
greater amount. Rev. Rul. 2003-10, 2003-1 C.B. 289.
23. See supra note 19 (finding no authority for deducting the repayment as employee
expenses in order "to avoid litigation or public disparagement"). In fact there is ample
precedent that voluntary payments made to protect the taxpayer's existing business
reputation are deductible. See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,560 (Jan. 21, 1976) (citing
cases illustrating business reputation principle); see also Pike v. Comm'r, 44 T.C. 787,
799 (1965) ("[Taxpayer] paid over the money because he feared lest further controversy
over the matter damage his status and reputation with the insurance industry and hence
endanger his professional career, which was closely tied to that industry. We have so
found. Nor do we think petitioner was unreasonable in his belief. No more is required for
petitioner's payment to Cardinal to be deductible as an ordinary and necessary business
expense under section 162(a).") (citation omitted); Conti v. Comm'r, 31 T.C.M. (CCH)
348, 356 (1972) (applying business reputation).
24. See I.R.C. § 56(b)(1)(A)(i) (2006) ("No deduction shall be allowed- for any
miscellaneous itemized deduction.").
25. I.R.C. § 55(b)(1)(A) (2006).
26. If a bonus returned during the same year is considered rescinded, the bonus is not
subject to wage taxes. See Rev. Rul. 78-198, 1978-1 C.B. 433 (stating that if employees
repay compensation within the same calendar year and the employer makes the adjust-
ments to the federal income tax withholding, the Forms W-2 should not reflect either the
wages or the withholding); see also infra notes 183-84.
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repayment under the regular income tax would be reduced by 3% to 4% of
Adjusted Gross Income (AGI) under the miscellaneous personal deduction
2% of AGI haircut27 plus the reductions of itemized deductions and per-
sonal exemptions for higher income taxpayers.28
The "deduction" objection pointed out by the Wall Street Journal Blog
is accurate enough if the bonus was actually received under an "absolute"
claim of right. The exclusion objection, however, does not tell the whole
story. Some authorities require only a rescission and return of both parties to
their position ante the bonus payment before the end of the tax year29 or a
27. See I.R.C. § 67 (2006) ("miscellaneous itemized deductions allowed [when]
the aggregate of such deductions exceeds 2 percent of [AGI]").
28. See I.R.C. § 68 (2006) (allowable itemized deductions reduced for higher income
earners).
29. See Penn v. Robertson, 115 F.2d 167, 171-72, 175-76 (4th Cir. 1940). In Penn, a
corporation sold to executives in January 1931 shares of its stock at a price less than 25%
of fair market value (which were held in trust with dividends to be applied to the pur-
chase price). A shareholder derivative suit was filed almost immediately, and contemp-
oraneously dividends of $31,500 were credited to the taxpayer's trust account. Id. at 171.
On the advice of counsel, the corporation rescinded the plan before the end of the year.
Id. In the rescission, the taxpayer's estate returned the stock and $31,500 in credited
dividends to the corporation-all before the end of 1931. Id. at 176. 'The whole
transaction was thus consummated within the calendar year 1931 on the basis of no profit
and no loss to either Penn or the [corporation]." Id. at 171. Penn held that the rescission
in 1931, before the close of the year, "extinguished what otherwise would have been
taxable income [to Penn] for that year." Id. at 172. The shareholder derivative suits in
Penn were analogous to the Congressional and public furor regarding the AIG bonuses.
If any bonus paid in 2008 is returned in 2009, Section 1341 should apply. See Barrett
v. Comm'r, 96 T.C. 713 (1991), nonacq., 1992-1 C.B. 1. In Barrett, after the SEC
commenced investigation of insider trading in options by a broker, "but before the U.S.
Attorney declined prosecution, two groups of specialist market maker option brokers
filed civil lawsuits against the [broker-taxpayer]." Id. at 715. A magistrate advised settle-
ment of the civil suits "to avoid the hazards of litigation present in a jury trial, possible
subsequent appeals which could result in very substantial legal fees, and adverse trial
publicity which could hurt [taxpayer's] brokerage business." While maintaining his in-
nocence, broker-taxpayer settled the civil suits "by disgorging ... $54,400 of his profit
from the sale of the options. The day after the suits were settled, the SEC dropped all
administrative proceedings to remove [taxpayer's] brokerage license." Id. at 715. The
Tax Court held that Section 1341 applied. See id. at 723-24 (not allowing legal fees to be
deducted). Agreeing that a "voluntary restoration" would not suffice, a conclusion that
the restoration of $54,400 was voluntarily made "without regard to any legal obligation
would, in our view, be ludicrous." Id. at 719. In response, the Service argued that the
nexus between the year one profit and the year two repayment was not shown. Barrett v.
Comm'r, 96 T.C. 713 (1991), action on dec., 1992-008 (Mar. 23, 1992). The above
summary of facts shows that the origin of the repayment was the insider trading charges
and the trading itself. Thus, the deduction would be a capital loss. See Anderson v.
Comm'r, 480 F.2d 1304, 1307 (7th Cir. 1973) (relying on Arrowsmith v. Comm'r, 344
2010]
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year-end netting of payment of compensation and adjustment without
regard to whether the bonus was received under an absolute right.30 Other
contrary authorities do not permit a same-year rescission or year-end netting
of a payment received under an absolute right.31 The better, conceptually
sound approach, this Article argues, is that a payment is received under only
an apparent right, versus an absolute right, when at the time of its receipt,
challenges are raised that might induce repayment.
32
Contemporary news stories, congressional hearings and floor debate
manifested intense political and popular outrage at the $165 million in AIG
"retention" bonuses made in March 2009.33 The House passed several acts
U.S. 6 (1952)). Section 1341 would apply to Arrowsmith. See S. REP. No. 83-1622, at
452 (1954) ("The section will apply to cases of transferee liability such as Arrowsmith v.
Commissioner (344 U.S. 6 (1952)).").
30. See McEwen v. Comm'r, 6 T.C. 1018, 1025 (1946) (distinguishing Stern-
Slegman-Prins Co. v. Comm'r, 79 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1935); Russell v. Comm'r, 35
B.T.A. 602 (1937); Fulton v. Comm'r, 11 B.T.A. 641 (1928); Couch v. Comm'r, 1
B.T.A. 103 (1924); I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 33,602 (Aug. 25, 1967) ('This is evident
from the 'cash basis' salary adjustment case of Albert W. Ressell [sic], 35 B.T.A. 602
(1937) (Acq. C.B. 1937-1, 22), wherein it was held that the corporate officer concerned
had 'actually received' no more than a certain net amount 'as salary' in the taxable year
at issue.").
31. See Crellin's Estate v. Comm'r, 203 F.2d 812, 814-15 (9th Cir. 1953)
("[Rescission] does not have the force and effect in [local] law of compelling the return
of payments made under a dividend declaration, but which in reality is a voluntary act,
[it] cannot create a deduction in any year.... [F]or tax purposes, it is that which the
holding company could have compelled, not that in which the stockholders were willing
to acquiesce, which controls. Otherwise, the taxpayers in this case could 'lift the federal
tax-hand' to suit their convenience.") (citation omitted).
32. See infra note 146 (Year 2 repayment); infra notes 190 & 216-17 and
accompanying text (Year 1 repayment).
33. See House AIG Hearings, supra note 4, at 54 ('The action we are taking today
[requesting a return of all or part of the March 2009 retention bonus] is a result of
discussions with numerous parties, many of you, including Attorney General Cuomo of
New York.") (statement of Edward Liddy, CEO, AIG). See generally AIG Bonus Outrage
Plays Treasury Officials for Saps, USA TODAY, Mar. 16, 2009, at 8A ("[A] 'really upset'
Treasury Secretary ... 'berated' AIG's CEO."); Andrews & Baker, supra note 4 ('The
bonus plan established for the financial products unit before the federal government
stepped in called for $220 million in retention pay for 400 employees for 2008. About
$55 million of that was paid in December and the remaining $165 million was paid on
Friday [March 13, 2009]."); David Cho & Brady Dennis, Bailout King AIG Still to Pay
Millions In Bonuses: Geithner Gets Firm To Make Revisions, WASH. POST Mar. 15,
2009, at Al ("[B]onuses and other payments have been exasperating government
officials"); Stephen Foley, Obama Fails to Halt AIG's $165m Bonus Payments, THE
INDEP. (London), Mar. 16, 2009, at 22 ("Politicians have reacted with fury."); Helen
Kennedy, AN OUTRAIGE! [sic] $450 Million in Bonuses Going to Execs Who Caused
Meltdown, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Mar. 16, 2009, at 5 ("Lawmakers erupted in fury ... after
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seeking to, in effect, claw back the bonuses. 34 These contemporaneous
challenges support a rescission of bonuses returned by the end of 2009 and
bailed-out AIG began paying out ... bonuses"); Liam Pleven & Sudeep Reddy, AIG
Bonuses Spark Outrage; Company's 'Hands Are Tied' in $450-Million Payout at Unit
that Lost $40.5-Billion, GLOBE & MAIL (Canada), Mar. 16, 2009, at B5 ("public outrage
grew over ... bonus payments"); E. Scott Reckard & Tom Petruno, AIG Names Firms that
Got Bailout Cash; The Disclosure, Long Sought, Doesn't Drown Out the Topic of the
Day: Outrage Over Employee Bonuses, L.A.TIMES, Mar. 16, 2009, at Al ("[P]ublic
officials expressed outrage at the giant insurer's decision to pay $165 million in
bonuses.").
34. The various proposals are discussed in Gary Shorter, Congressional Research
Service Report for Congress: "Say on Pay" and Other Corporate Governance Reform
Initiatives, 1-2 R4076 (Aug. 13, 2009), available at http://waxman.house.gov/Uploaded
files/SayOnPayand Other_Initiative.pdf. See also Jonathan Karl, Payback Time?
House Approves Bonus Tax; House Lawmakers Pass 90 Percent Tax on Bonuses at AIG,
Bailed Out Companies, ABC NEWS INTERNET VENTURES, Mar. 19, 2009, http://abcnews.
go.com/Business/Politics/story?id=7122719&page=1 (house votes to tax bailout money);
Florence Olsen, House Passes Legislation to Establish Executive Pay Standards for 'Bad
Actors', DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) No. 61, at G-9 (Apr. 2, 2009).
A bill (H.R. 1664) to curb 'unreasonable or excessive' executive
compensation at firms that accepted federal bailout funds passed the
House April 1 by 247-171 after a lengthy floor debate.
The measure would amend the Emergency Economic Stabilization
Act (EESA) of 2008 (Pub. L. No. 109-280) to prohibit unreasonable
and excessive compensation, and compensation not based on perform-
ance standards, at companies that receive direct capital investments of
taxpayer money....
The bill would restrict the compensation of executives and
employees of institutions receiving capitalization funding through
EESA's Troubled Asset Relief Program and the Housing and Economic
Recovery Act of 2008, which applies to executives and employees of
the Federal National Mortgage Association, the Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corporation, and Federal Home Loan Bank.
The bill also would repeal an amendment to the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Pub. L. No. 111-5),
effectively making bonus restrictions apply to the American Inter-
national Group and other recipients of TARP funds, regardless of when
those companies signed bonus agreements.
Standards for compensation that is 'unreasonable or excessive'
would be determined by the treasury secretary in consultation with and
approval from federal financial regulators.
Id. A search of thomas.loc.gov on February 24, 2010 indicated that none of these bills
were enacted. See Pub. L. 111-21, Section 5, 123 Stat. 1617, 1625 (2009) (establishing a
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission). The Proposed Compensation Payments of Special
Master Feinberg provide an incentive for AIG Financial Products Unit employees who
made pledges to return part of the March 2009 retention bonuses to honor such pledges.
These rules are pursuant to the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub.
L. No. 111-5, div. B tit. VII, 123 Stat. 516. See supra note 18.
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hence exclusions from (1) regular taxable income, (2) alternative minimum
taxable income, and (3) the taxable wage base,35 as if the bonuses were
never received.
Similar outrage had been voiced as to the bonuses paid in 2008:
Executives at government-rescued AIG who are taking cash perks to
remain in their jobs-some as much as $3 million-are lucky even to
be employed. So says Rep. Elijah Cummings (D-Md.), who blasted
AIG's decision to give retention bonuses to 130 managers while the
government puts up billions for a rescue makeover....
As a condition of taking its rescue cash, Congress said AIG and
other firms must curtail excessive executive pay and perks. AIG agreed
to freeze bonuses and perks, but days later, AIG disclosed the retention
awards. At the time of the September filing, an AIG spokesman had
said the awards to its 130 managers technically aren't bonuses and
don't violate the spirit of Congress' will. 36
Such outrage supports a Section 1341 adjustment concerning repayment in
2009.37 A word to the wise, do not call it a "voluntary" repayment or
"giving" the bonus back.38
35. See also Rev. Rul. 75-531, 1975-2 C.B. 31, 32 (bonuses, when repaid, may be
adjusted out of gross income); Rev. Rul. 66-167, 1966-1 C.B. 20 (commissions not
included in gross earnings).
36. Paul Tharp, AIG in Bonus Bungle-Pol Rips Retention Pay, N.Y POST, Dec. 3,
2008, at 35. See generally Christine Harper, Main Street to Wall Street: Give Up the
Bonus Checks for Good!, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, New Jersey), Nov. 16, 2008, at B 1
(noting how taxpayers want bonuses eliminated); Beth Healy, Guidelines Urge Curbs on
CEO Pay, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 26, 2008, at B5 ("Yesterday, New York Attorney
General Andrew Cuomo held a press conference after insurer American International
Group, which is tapping $150 billion in federal funds, agreed to eliminate bonuses and
salary increases for top executives. Cuomo had called for the move. AIG said its chief
executive, Edward M. Liddy, would take $1 in base salary for 2008 and 2009."); David S.
Hilzenrath, AIG Limits Pay of Its Top Executives, WASH. POST, Nov. 26, 2008, at DI
("New York Attorney General Andrew M. Cuomo wrote to Liddy last week, saying it
'seems hard to imagine that AIG could pay significant bonuses or give raises to execu-
tives after the company has quite literally been bailed out by the American taxpayer."');
Heather Landy, Growing Sense Of Outrage Over Executive Pay, WASH. POST, Nov. 15,
2008, at A8; Heather Landy & Lori Montgomery, Banks Getting U.S. Aid Pressed Over
Bonus Plans; N.Y. Attorney General's Letter Follows Congressional Efforts to Toughen
Rules on Executive Pay, WASH. POST, Oct. 30, 2008, at D3.
37. See supra note 29; see also John W. Lee & Mark S. Bader, Contingent Income
Items and Cost Basis Corporate Acquisitions: Correlative Adjustments and Clearer
Reflection of Income, 12 J. CORP. L. 137, 173-86 (1987).
38. Voluntariness of payment has been held to bar rescission and the availability of
Section 1341. See Crellin's Estate v. Comm'r, 203 F.2d 812, 814-15 (9th Cir. 1953);
I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 35,953 (Aug. 19, 1974) (treating as similar retroactive payback
of salary and dividends) (considering Rev. Rul. 74-582, 1974-2 C.B. 34); I.R.S. Gen.
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Since there are conflicting cases on the tax consequences and Congress
has sent messages to AIG executives to encourage return of the bonuses,39
in order to encourage bonus repayment and for easier tax administration,
this Article argues that Congress should explicitly provide for: (1) an
exclusion of any bonus from a TARP beneficiary repaid in 2009 from
regular income, AMT, and taxable wage taxes; and (2) a Section 1341
adjustment for any 2009 repayments of bonuses paid in 2008 by AIG or any
other TARP beneficiary. The Internal Revenue Service (the Service) should
also issue a notice to the same effect. Ideally, the Service should rethink
rescission within year one, year-end netting, and Section 1341 in terms of
conditions subsequent and external pressure that could induce repayment.
However, the urgency of quicker regulation to encourage the Congressional
favored repayment of executive bonuses suggests instead that the Service
should issue a ruling or notice based on administrative convenience and the
public policy of not undercutting a strongly articulated Congressional policy
of encouraging paybacks of bonuses paid to executives of TARP benefited
companies. 0
Couns. Mem. 35,484 (Sept. 17, 1973) (proposing revocation of Rev. Rul. 69-115, 1969-1
C.B. 50 and treating as similar "voluntary" repayments of excessive salary, excessive
rents, excessive royalties, and dividends); Oswald, action on dec., No. 6301-66, 1968
AOD LEXIS 327, at *1 (Aug. 20, 1968) (citing Simon, Crellin's Estate, and Berger, and
stating that "[tihe Service's position is that repayments of amounts received under a
claim of right are not deductible where made voluntarily and not under legal obligation.
Legal obligation generally means that the obligation is enforceable under applicable state
law and not because the taxpayer in the exercise of his business judgment believes it to be
enforceable."). The better view is that "voluntary" is a code word for no business
purpose, just tax reduction. See, e.g., Nat'l Life and Accident Ins. Co. v. United States,
244 F. Supp. 135, 137 (M.D. Tenn. 1965) (citing United States v. Simon, 281 F.2d 520
(6th Cir. 1960) and Crellin's Estate v. Comm'r, 203 F.2d 812 (9th Cir.)), aff'd, 385 F.2d
832 (6th Cir. 1967); see also Blanton v. Comm'r, 46 T.C. 527, 530 (1966), affd, per
curiam, 379 F.2d 558 (5th Cir. 1967).
39. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
40. Traditionally, when formulating tax policy the Service has taken into account a
public policy articulated in non-tax Congressional actions so as not to frustrate such
Congressional policy. See John W. Lee, Glenn Walberg & Darryl D. Whitesell,
Capitalizing and Depreciating Cyclical Aircraft Maintenance Costs: More-Trouble-
Than-It's-Worth?, 17 VA. TAx REv. 161, 224-39 (1997). An IRS official has stated in the
context of corporate rescission transactions that any restriction of the Service's liberal
policy as to rescissions within the same year, provided that the parties had agreed to a
contingency of rescission, would be "a further guidance policy." Amy S. Elliot, IRS
Official Explains Position on Corporate Rescissions, 123 TAX NOTEs 1406 (June 22,
2009).
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I. CASE STUDY
A. Hypotheticals
Assume that executive A received a sizable "retention" bonus from a
TARP recipient corporation, say AIG, in December 2008, and heeding the
March 2009 request of its CEO to demonstrate leadership or do the right
thing and "give it back,', 4 1 A, still employed by the corporation, returned
to AIG in 2009 an amount equal to some, or all, of the bonus. Assume that
executive B received a similar bonus in 2008; "completed ... [his or her]
work and ... [his or her responsibility] was wound down to [the
corporation's] satisfaction, ... [he or she left close] to the end of the
,,42 4year,'  i.e., 2008, and gave back the bonus in 2009.43 Assume that
executive C, still employed by the corporation, received the same retention
bonus in 2009 and gave it back in 2009. Also assume that executive D
received the same retention bonus in 2009, left the corporation in 2009
under the same circumstances as executive B, and gave the bonus back in
2009. Further assume that all four received the retention bonus pursuant to
a contract after meeting all of the contractual terms,44 none of which
required repayment of the retention bonus if certain conditions subsequent
occurred.
The hypotheticals can be expanded further by assuming the executives
who left before repayment in 2009 were employed in similar positions
with similar duties by the end of 2009, with another employer, or were
seeking such positions. Alternatively, assume that the former executive
was self-employed when he or she gave back the bonus in 2009.
41. See House AIG Hearing, supra note 4, at 54, 65-66 (statement of Ed Liddy, AIG
CEO).
42. See id. at 77-78.
43. It is possible that AIG 2009 bonuses will be repaid in 2010 given that some
executives who had pledged to repay retention bonuses in 2009 had not done so by
October 22, 2009. Letter, supra note 13. Such employees will be paid their cash base
salary as of December 31, 2008, until such pledges are met. Id. at A12. Note that the
requirement of payment of base compensation above a stated floor in the form of
restricted stock is to apply only to post-October 2009 payments. Id. at 1-2. If it applied to
March 2009 cash payments, rescission would not be available. Cf. Comm'r v. Fender
Sales, Inc., 338 F.2d 924, 929 (9th Cir. 1964) ("[D]ischarge by a corporation of its salary
obligations to [shareholder-employees] by the issuance of the corporation's capital stock"
were payments and realization of income by the shareholder-employees.).
44. See, e.g., House AIG Hearing, supra note 4, at 72-73, 77-78, 92, 117.
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B. Summary of Conclusions
What are the tax consequences to each of these executives or former
executives? The only certain answer is that executives who received their
retention bonus in 2008 and gave it back in 2009 are taxed in 2008 under
the common law "claim of right" doctrine45 on the amount of the retention
bonus presumably subject to an up to 35% federal income tax rate4 6 and
4.2% Medicare taxes. The tax treatment of repayment in 2009 of a
retention bonus received in 2008, and the tax treatment of the retention
bonus in 2009 given back in 2009 are murkier. This is due to a briar-patch
of different doctrines and rules potentially applicable, usually with con-
flicting authorities under each doctrine or rule. Potential doctrines and
rules include: (1) repayment in 2009 of a bonus received in 2008 under a
claim of right, versus "voluntary" (hence non-deductible) repayment in
2009 of a 2008 bonus; (2) exclusion if rescission is within the same tax
year; (3) year-end netting versus taxable receipt if there is an absolute
right when received; (4) miscellaneous employee trade or business
expenses paid in 2009 to protect the executive's existing business reputa-
tion; and (5) for an executive who has left employment before repayment,
new job expense if self-employed.
The main conflict running through this doctrinal briar-patch is between
the views that: (a) taxpayers receiving payments with no preconditions or
conditions subsequent cannot "'lift the federal tax-hand' to suit their con-
venience' 47 by repayment in the same tax year; nor may taxpayers deduct
under a corollary to the claim of right doctrine repayments made in the
next tax year, if the year one payments were made with no preconditions
or conditions subsequent;4 8 and (b) parties may rescind a transaction (or
net with repayments) within the same tax year, thus restoring their
positions status ante.49 A more nuanced view is that where the taxpayer
and the corporation are aware of external circumstances existing at the
time of the year one payment which may come to induce rescission or a
repayment in the same tax year or subsequent tax year, rescission is
45. Cf Rev. Rul. 78-198, 1978-1 C.B. 433.
46. Plus exemption and itemized deductions phase-outs applicable to higher income
individuals.
47. Leicht v. Comm'r, 137 F.2d 433, 435 (8th Cir. 1943) (holding that amounts
received as salary cannot be retroactively changed during the same year by the modifica-
tion of the salary agreement or by resolution of the board of directors of a corporation);
accord Crellin's Estate v. Comm'r, 203 F.2d 812, 815 (9th Cir. 1953).
48. See Rev. Rul. 69-115, 1969-1 C.B. 50.
49. Couch v. Comm'r, 1 B.T.A. 103 (1924), acq. 1925-1 C.B. 1; see also Nat'l Life
& Accident Ins. Co. v. United States, 244 F. Supp. 135, 138 (M.D. Tenn. 1965).
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permitted in the former case and a Section 1341 adjustment in the latter
case 5 1 if the premise that such event will not occur proves erroneous, i.e.,
such condition subsequent is not fulfilled. The political and popular out-
rage over the payment of executive bonuses by a TARP beneficiary should
be such a circumstance.
52
The net result is uncertainty as to tax consequences for employees of
TARP recipients who return their bonuses within the same or succeeding
tax year. Such uncertainty could retard repayment by employees,53 which
could have severe adverse political and economic consequences, 54 and
could cause tax administrative difficulties for the Service as to employees
or former employees who do make repayments in 2009.
50. See infra notes 153, 161-62 and accompanying text.
51. See infra notes 146, 163 and accompanying text.
52. See supra note 36 and infra note 179 and accompanying text.
53. CEO Liddy told Congress that he was unable to provide the final number of
returns "pending the resolution of certain tax implications and administrative details
posed by return of the retention payments." House AIG Hearings, supra note 4, at 324.
54. Id. at 57 (statement of Subcomm. Chair Paul Kanjorski, D-Pa.). Instead of with-
holding the retention bonuses, like its withholding of $93.9 million in planned deferred
compensation distributions, AIG paid the bonuses. Then, "the company hid behind legal
technicalities, and the public outcry ... happened: AIG has become the subject of
considerable public scorn, and the public's interest in providing ongoing, sustainable
support to repair our struggling financial system has plummeted." Id. at 3. This
sentiment was wide spread. See, e.g., 155 CONG. REc. H3643, 3646 (daily ed. Mar. 19,
2009) (statement of Rep. Carolyn Maloney, D-N.Y) ("[lit has become somewhat rare for
the Members of this body to find themselves in virtually universal agreement, but outrage
over the retention bonuses for the very members of the AIG Financial Products Division,
who brought a corporate giant to its knees and the economy of our Nation to a standstill,
has produced such an agreement. It would be both morally reprehensible and fiscally
irresponsible for us to quietly hand over millions to those who have cost this country
billions. And it is a rare cause that compels so many Members, all acting independently,
to craft bills aimed at righting the same wrong"). In fact, the AIG Financial Unit
employees responsible for these losses were in the part of the Unit dealing with credit
default swaps. Credit default swaps are "derivative instrument[s] that provide[]
insurance-like protection to investors against credit losses from the underlying oblige-
tions which were typically mortgage loans." House AIG Hearing, supra note 4, at 17
(statement of Scott M. Polakoff, Acting Director, Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS)). By
the time of the hearing the people dealing with credit default swaps were all gone and the
retention bonuses were to be made to employees in the "derivatives book." Id. at 91-92,
105-06 (statements of Edward Liddy, CEO, AIG). The derivatives book also appears to
involve substantial risk. Id. at 55-56. A Gallup poll reported that 76% of Americans
wanted the AIG bonuses blocked or recovered. Lymari Morales, Outraged Americans
Want AIG Bonus Money Recovered, Gallup Poll, (Mar. 18, 2009), available at
www.gallup.com/poll/1 16941/Outraged-Americans-AIG-Bonus-Money-Recovered.aspx.
For a taste of the outrage in the media see supra note 36 and infra note 179.
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Ideally (a) any legislation enacted imposing excise taxes on employee
and former employee bonuses received from a covered TARP recipient (or
in part on the employee and in part on the TARP recipient), if not paid
back before the end of the tax year in which the bonus is due, or (b) any
amendment to the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 prohibit-
ing unreasonable and excessive compensation and compensation not based
on performance standards should address the payback tax issues exposed
in this Article.
Even if no such legislation is enacted, there may have already been
repayments by TARP recipient executives in 2009 of some bonuses (some
paid by TARP recipients in 2008; others paid in 2009) and possibly by
former TARP recipient employees who may be employed in positions
with similar duties, still seeking such a position, or self-employed.
Accordingly, the Service should promptly address the payback/claim of
right issues for bonuses paid in 2008, and rescission or year-end netting
tax issues for bonuses paid in 2009.
This Article proposes that paybacks in the year of payment be treated
as an exclusion from AGI (wage taxes would reflect the income tax
exclusion).55 Truly restoring the TARP recipient and the executive to the
status quo ante as tax rescission demands, conceptually would require the
executive to pay to the TARP recipient, in addition to the amount of the
bonus returned, an interest charge for the use of the money before return.
56
Paybacks in 2009 of bonuses paid in 2008 should give rise to a Section
1341 adjustment under the most liberal interpretation, treating the 2009
political and popular outrage calling for repayment as the non-fulfillment
of the 2008 premise that such outrage would not occur in 2009.
The ideal legislative solution (by a tightly sunsetted statutory amend-
ment or by Committee Reports so long as a statutory peg is enacted)
would be for exclusion of 2008 bonuses from income in 2008 if promptly
paid back in 2009. Alternatively, Congress could amend Section 1341 to
provide for a year two deduction (perhaps treated as a business loss for net
operating loss (NOL) purposes so that a 2009 deduction far exceeding
taxable income could be carried back to offset the income reported in
2008). 7 The Service probably could not provide a 2008 exclusion from
AGI for a bonus paid in that year and repaid in 2009. It could provide a
55. See infra notes 183-84 and accompanying text.
56. I thank one of my colleagues for this insight. A handy analog would be the
interest charge under I.R.C. § 453(1)(3)(B) (2006).
57. Congress might address the wage tax problems and the phase out/hair cut of
itemized deductions and personal exemptions in 2008 with a 2009 repayment. See infra
note 184.
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year two Section 1341 adjustment as discussed below. The Service could
easily provide under administrative convenience an exclusion as to a
covered bonus received and paid back in 2009. It could also accept a
rescission in 2009 based on awareness of outside pressure at the time of
payment that could predictably lead to a mutual rescission in 2009.58
In the absence of such resolution, the majority doctrinal view is that
Section 1341 would not be available to a taxpayer repaying in 2009 a
bonus received in 2008 because there was no assumption that the 2008
payment might turn out in 2009 to be erroneous. 59 The minority view
would allow a Section 1341 recomputation in 2009, essentially on the
basis that Section 1341 was intended to be remedial.60 Moreover, a sound
conceptual basis for application of Section 1341 as to a 2009 repayment is
that at the time of the payment in 2008, the TARP recipient and the
executive must have assumed that opposition in 2009 would not induce a
requirement of repayment (or political allies could thwart it). When that
premise turned out in 2009 to be erroneous, repayment of the retention
bonus would then trigger availability of Section 1341.
While there is ample precedent that a repayment in 2009 of a bonus,
received in either 2008 or 2009, pursuant to an agreement entered into in
2009 after receipt of the bonus, is "voluntary," i.e., not legally required,
and hence not deductible, 61 the better reasoned view is that if the 2009
repayment is an ordinary and necessary expense of the employee's busi-
ness in 2009, such as protecting his or her business reputation, it should be
deductible in 2009.62 Even if this theory is accepted, such a deduction of
the repayment would be subject to the 2% of AGI haircut for miscellan-
eous individual expenses and phase-out limitations on itemized deduc-
tions, and personal exemptions of higher-income taxpayers. 63 Mostsignificantly, miscellaneous itemized deductions are specifically
58. See Penn v. Robertson, 115 F.2d 167, 173 (4th Cir. 1940).
59. See infra note 119.
60. See, e.g., Dominion Res., Inc. v. United States, 219 F.3d 359, 363, 369 (4th Cir.
2000) (Section 1341 meant to be remedial).
61. As discussed above at note 23 and below at notes 263 and 270-71 and accom-
panying text, "voluntary payments" made to protect the taxpayer-employee's existing
business reputation are deductible.
62. See Conti v. Comm'r, 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 348 (1972) ("Clearly the fact that the
payment was 'voluntarily' made does not automatically deprive petitioner of the claimed
deduction."); cf Anderson v. Comm'r, 56 T.C. 1370 (1971), rev'd on other grounds, 480
F.2d 1304 (7th Cir. 1973). This Article agrees with Anderson. See infra note 74 and
accompanying text.
63. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
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notdeductible for the Alternative Minimum Tax,64 but Section 1341
adjust-ments are excluded from such terms.
65
If the employee has already left the TARP recipient corporation before
repayment in 2009 and is neither employed in a similar job as an
employee with similar duties at the time of the repayment or perhaps by
end of first tax year repayment, 66 nor still seeking such a position, the
expense might be considered non-deductible under Welch v. Helvering.
67
Under Welch, if the expense is paid in a new business of self-employment
or in a new job (if the employee has different duties), it is considered a
capital expenditure, that is, the cost of acquiring a new capital asset-the
new business or new reputation/goodwill. Such capital expenditure should
at best be amortizable over 15 years. 68 Arguably, under more modem
64. I.R.C. § 56(b)(1)(A)(i) (2006).
65. I.R.C. § 56(g)(4)(B) (2006).
66. See United States v. Manor Care, Inc., 490 F. Supp. 355, 360 (D. Md. 1980)
(stating that a taxpayer could deduct recurring expenses incurred during the year prior to
obtaining a license and operating a business "where the expenses were incurred in the
same tax year as the issuance of the license"). See generally John W. Lee, Start-up Costs,
Section 195, and Clear Reflection of Income: A Tale of Talismans, Tacked-on Tax
Reform, and a Touch of Basics, 6 VA. TAX REV. 1, 47-51 (1986).
67. 290 U.S. 111 (1933). Our task herein is essentially one of drawing a line between
expenditures to preserve and protect business reputation and those which improve and
develop good will. The Supreme Court, in deciding against the taxpayer in Welch v.
Helvering, supra, recognized that
[m]any cases in the federal courts deal with phases of the problem
presented in the case at bar. To attempt to harmonize them would be a
futile task. They involve the appreciation of particular situations, at
times with borderline conclusions ....
We are likewise unimpressed with respondent's attempt to
characterize the payments as capital in nature because the claimed
benefits would inure to petitioner beyond the taxable year.
Concededly, such benefits often have an effect over a substantial period
of time. But, the key question is whether such effect is the prime
purpose of the payment, i.e., the creation of good will, or whether it is
incidental to a primary purpose to protect and preserve an existing asset
or advantage, such as we believe was the case herein. The concept of
capitalization, which respondent seeks to sustain, is present in cases
where current deductibility has been permitted for advertising expend-
itures and expenditures to improve one's skills utilized in existing
employment, even though there were indications that some general
benefit would in all probability last beyond the year of expenditure.
Conti v. Comm'r, 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 348 (1972).
68. See Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3(b)(1) (2009); Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-4(d) (2009); see
also John W. Lee, Transaction Costs Relating to Acquisition or Enhancement of
Intangible Property: A Populist, Political, but Practical Perspective, 22 VA. TAX REV.
273, 350-55 (2002); John Lee et al., Restating Capitalization Standards and Rules: The
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precedents as to what constitutes a trade or business, 69 a switch from being
an employee performing certain tasks and duties, to being self-employed
in the same profession performing similar tasks with similar duties should
not be treated as different trades or businesses. Even so, such a repayment
would be subject to phase-outs for higher income individual income
taxpayers, but not subject to either the limitations on miscellaneous
individual expenses nor to non-deductibility for AMT purposes.
As to an executive receiving a bonus in 2009 and repaying it in 2009,
Section 1341 is clearly unavailable since it requires receipt in year one and
payback in year two. 7 0 Some very early cases (and especially their
progeny) would allow exclusion of a bonus repaid within the same tax
year of its receipt under the broad rule that determination of whether the
taxpayer realizes compensatory income is made on a net basis at the end
of the tax year.71 Other authorities reach the same result under a rescission
rule if the parties are restored to the status quo ante by the end of the tax
year.
72
There are conflicting authorities as to year-end netting and rescission
doctrines. The more principled view as to both is that if there was no
assumption at the time of the payment of the bonus that turns out to be
incorrect at the time of the repayment, the original payment and repayment
Case for "Rough Justice" Regulations (Part Two), 23 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 1483, 1537,
1541-48 (1997); John Lee et al., Restating Capitalization Standards and Rules: The Case
for Rough Justice Regulations (Part One), 23 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 631, 711-12 (1997).
69. The critical issue is whether the business of being an employee for an old
business is the same business as being self-employed in the same field using the same
skills. See Conti, 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 348; Jenkins v. Comm'r, 47 T.C.M. (CCH) 238
(1983) (finding that Conway Twitty's motive in repaying Twitty Burger investors was to
protect his personal business reputation since the success of country musicians is
extremely dependent on their images). Wikipedia's entry on Jenkins v. Commissioner
refers to Judge Leo Irwin's famous "Ode to Conway Twitty" and speculates that
"members of the Court may have been country music aficionados as well." Wikipedia,
Jenkins v. Commissioner, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jenkins v._Commissioner. I can
affirm that was the case, and more significantly, that Judge Irwin knew Appalachian
honor, being a native of Allegany County, North Carolina, where I went for part of grade
school and high school and lived next to my Uncle Hardin Royall-a descendent of the
first settler in our part of the County. Once when asked by an old-school gentleman,
"whose boy are ye?" (there were no Lee's save me in that county), I replied, "My
mother's oldest sister married Hardin Royall." He said, "Oh, I know the Royall's."
Appalachian (Scotch-Irish) identification of in-laws with a local family appears derived
from a lowland Scot folk way. See David Hackett Fischer, ALBION'S SEED: FOUR BRITISH
FOLKWAYS IN AMERICA 665-66 (1989).
70. See I.R.C. § 1341 (2006).
71. See infra notes 245-46 and accompanying text.
72. See infra notes 229-30 and accompanying text.
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do not cancel each other out and do not unwind the original payment by
rescission. 73 Again, the view that if rescission is not legally required, the
repayment in the same year is "voluntary" and non-deductible is erroneous
where circumstances at the time of payment might force a rescission or
repayment by year-end.74 But such deductible repayment would be virt-
ually worthless under the AMT non-deductibility rules discussed above.
75
If the employee has already left by the time of repayment, the same new
business imbroglio would apply, but if these shoals can be avoided, the
miscellaneous deduction perils are avoided as well.
Conversely, the better reasoned view is that at the time of the 2009
payment, given the substantial political and popular opposition to payment
of retention bonuses, the TARP recipient and the executive must have
assumed that such opposition would not be so fierce as to induce a
requirement of repayment (or that political allies could thwart it). If and
when that premise turns out to be erroneous in 2009, repayment of the
retention bonus would trigger the rescission doctrine or year-end netting.
II. DOCTRINAL BRIAR-PATCH: INTO THE MAELSTROM
This Article first analyzes the tax treatment of return of a bonus in the
year after received (year two) and then applies the underlying principles to
a repayment in year one because the principles are not clearly articulated
by the cases or commentators. The principles undergirding the case law
claim of right year two deduction and statutory Section 1341 adjustment
are relevant to repayment of a bonus in the year of receipt, particularly as
to the strict interpretation of the obligation to repay in year one.
Accordingly, a year two repayment of an amount received in year one
under a claim of right is examined next.
A. Claim of Right Doctrine
It is not clear whether any of the bonuses paid to executives in
December 2008 by a TARP recipient have been returned in 2009.76 As to
repayment of bonuses by AIG executives, the critical issue under both the
73. See generally David Hasen, Unwinding Unwinding, 57 EMORY L.J. 871 (2008).
74. See infra notes 216-17, 229-38 and accompanying text.
75. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
76. About $55 million of retention bonuses were paid in December 2008 to AIG
Financial Products employees, but many references to 2008 bonus appear to mean a
bonus received in 2009 with respect to work in 2008. See supra note 4 and accompanying
text.
2010]
344 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 1:323
common law and statutory versions of the claim of right doctrine is the
nature of the year two compulsion-whether (a) the repayment obligation
must be legally enforceable; or (b) whether conditions at the time of
payment must indicate the potential for adverse claims against the
payment.
1. Common Law
The annual accounting principle holds that each tax year stands on its
own, and a transaction usually should be closed and reported in year one
even though facts may turn out different in year two. 77 Accordingly,
[e]vents in a subsequent tax year (year [two]) cannot, absent an express
statutory requirement, serve to reopen a prior year (year [one]) and
adjust a transaction [previously] reported in year one. This is true
regardless of whether the statute of limitations has run on [the] year
[one] transaction. The annual accounting principle is an administrative
rule and yields to exception[] when Congress so provides.78
Most of these exceptions operate by reopening year one 79 without regard
to the statute of limitations and adjust the original transaction 8°-an
"exact' transactional approach.'
77. See Lee & Bader, supra note 37, at 171-72; see also Hasen, supra note 73, at 880
& n.32 ("The annual accounting principle requires the determination of income at the
close of the taxable year without regard to the effect of subsequent events.").
78. Lee & Bader, supra note 37, at 172.
79. Id. at 172-73 (citations omitted); see also Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282
U.S. 359, 365 (1931) (stating that, while a transactional system could be devised,
Congress is not constitutionally required "to adopt such a system in preference to the
more familiar method, even if it were practicable"). Later the same year the Court
adopted, in effect, a partially transactional system for open transactions in Burnet v.
Logan, 283 U.S. 404, 413-14 (1931). See generally Jeffrey M. Kilmer, Note, "Open"
Transactions in Federal Income Taxation, 38 U. CIN. L. REv. 62 (1969).
80. For example,
[I]f the acquisition of a "prohibited interest" within the 10-year
look-forward period occurs under a waiver of family attribution, then
generally year [one] is reopened and what originally was treated as
"redemption" under § 302(a) and (b) may now be a dividend. See
I.R.C. § 302(c)(2) (West Supp. 1986). A tax-free § 332 liquidation of a
"controlled" subsidiary by a corporate parent on a tax-free basis may
take as long as three years. However, if the transaction commenced in
year [one] does not produce a complete liquidation within the
three-year period, year [one] is reopened and any distributions
[previously] treated as distributions in complete liquidation of a
controlled subsidiary are recharacterized as dividends in year [one].
Lee & Bader, supra note 37, at 172 n.228 (citations omitted); Treas. Reg. § 1.631-2(d)(2)
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When a transaction has effects in more than one tax year, some
commentators have called for transactional reporting under which year
one and year two events would be taken into account in year two. The
transactional reporting system adjusts for rate and bracket changes by
charging an interest factor for any deferral of reporting. The "exact" tran-
sactional approach, after a false start, has not been accepted judicially
82
but on occasion has been legislated.83
The harshness of the annual accounting principle "spawned" a number
of "necessary counterweights" aimed at ameliorating distortion of income
when an assumption underlying the year one reporting a fundamentally
inconsistent event in year two shows the year one assumption to have been
erroneous.84 Courts evolved two alternative modifications as "necessary
counterweight[s] to the consequences of the annual accounting princ-
iple,"85 aimed at minimizing distortion of income and approximating
transactional reporting.
86
The more common alternative exceptions to the annual accounting
principle provide year two adjustments when the year one transaction was
closed using the best assumption possible at that time as to its ultimate
outcome, but that assumption turns out in year two to have been err-
oneous.87 The year two transactional balancing entry adjustment to the
annual accounting principle has been perceived most clearly by judges
(and commentators) in the tax benefit area, as evidenced by Hillsboro
National Bank v. Commissioner.8 8 The annual accounting system in ess-
ence provides that each tax year stands on its own. Hence, if an apparently
(2006) provides for re-characterization in year one of advance bonus royalties where the
contract expires in year 2 before the timber is cut. I believe that this legislation, ignored
in practice, is invalid, reopening year one.
81. Lee & Bader, supra note 37, at 172.
82. Id. at 172-73.
83. See supra note 80.
84. See, e.g., Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v. Comm'r, 460 U.S. 370, 389 n.24 (1983) ("In
situations implicating the tax benefit rule or the analogous doctrine permitting the tax-
payer to take a deduction when income recognized earlier under a claim of right must be
repaid ... the problem is that the taxpayer has mischaracterized some event. Either he has
recognized income that eventually turns out not to be income, or he has taken a deduction
that eventually turns out not to be a deduction.").
85. Estate of Munter v. Comm'r, 63 T.C. 663, 678 (1975) (Tannenwald, J.,
concurring) (describing the true character of the tax benefit doctrine). Professor Bittker
described Judge Tannenwald's insight as a perceptive comment. Boris I. Bittker &
Stephen B. Kanner, The Tax Benefit Rule, 26 UCLA L. REV. 265, 269 (1978).
86. Hillsboro Nat'l Bank, 460 U.S. at 381.
87. Id. at 383.
88. 460 U.S. 370 (1983).
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closed transaction in year one unexpectedly reopens in a subsequent tax
year (year two), an adjustment is not made to year one's return, but
instead, an adjustment is made in year two. The year two adjustment does
not produce exact transactional equivalence, i.e., re-opening year one or its
practical equivalent, due to potential rate or bracket changes and lack of an
interest factor. A year two balancing entry merely produces, in Justice
O'Connor's apt words, "a less precise correction-far superior to none."
89
Under the tax benefit theory, a year one deduction which becomes
known in year two to be erroneous allows for a deduction of year one state
taxes and a partial state refund in year two. An income adjustment or
balancing entry equal to the year two state tax refund is then made in year
two to the extent the year one deduction gave rise to a federal income tax
benefit. The year two adjustment is necessary to achieve a rough trans-
actional parity with a transaction in which all events occurred in year
one.90 Justice O'Connor also noted that this same transactional equiv-
alence underlies the year two deduction under the claim of right doctrine,
9 1
as earlier recognized by some perceptive cases,
92 and commentators. 93
Professor Boris Bittker accurately perceived such transactional equiv-
alence and balancing entry as being the policy core of (a) the Crane (and
hence Tufts) doctrine; 94 (b) the cancellation of indebtedness doctrine;95 (c)
89. ld. at 380 n. 11.
90. Id. at 383.
91. Id. at 377-78 n.9 & 389 n.24.
92. See, e.g., United States v. Skelly Oil Co., 394 U.S. 678, 686 n.5 (1969); United
States v. Rexach, 482 F.2d 10, 23-24 (1st Cir. 1973) (tax benefit and claim of right
doctrine are analogous).
93. See, e.g., William T. Plumb, Jr., The Tax Benefit Rule Today, 57 HARV. L. REV.
129, 176-79 & n.172 (1943); see also John W. Lee & Nina R. Murphy, Capital Expend-
itures: A Result in Search of a Rationale, 15 U. RICH. L. REV. 473, 505-09 (1981).
94. Comm'r v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 309 (1983) (Commissioner "may include in the
amount realized the amount of the nonrecourse mortgage assumed by the purchaser. The
rationale for this treatment is that the original inclusion of the amount of the mortgage in
basis rested on the assumption that the mortgagor incurred an obligation to repay.
Moreover, this treatment balances the fact that the mortgagor originally received the
proceeds of the nonrecourse loan tax-free on the same assumption."); id. at 312 ("[T]he
mortgagor received the loan proceeds tax-free and included them in his basis on the
understanding that he had an obligation to repay the full amount."); see also Woodsam
Assocs., Inc. v. Comm'r, 198 F.2d 357, 359 (2d Cir. 1952); Boris I. Bittker, Tax Shelters,
Nonrecourse Debt, and the Crane Case, 33 TAX L. REv. 277, 283 (1978). When the
obligation is canceled, the mortgagor is relieved of his responsibility to repay the sum he
originally received and thus realizes value to that extent within the meaning of I.R.C. §
1001(b) (2006). From the mortgagor's point of view, when his obligation is assumed by a
third party who purchases the encumbered property, it is as if the mortgagor first had
been paid with cash borrowed by the third party from the mortgagee on a nonrecourse
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the tax benefit rule;96 and (d) the year two deduction under the claim of
right doctrine. 97 The fundamental policy is that a year two adjustment
produces a clearer reflection of income than the absence of a year two
balancing entry, given that year one cannot be reopened judicially or
administratively (which would be the ideal rule, albeit at the cost of
certainty of a filed return).
Unfortunately, the first cases that fashioned each of these rules and
doctrines did not explicitly recognize the balancing entry concept; but
instead, adopted different legal fictions-particularly as to income adjust-
ments in year two.9 8 The doctrines usually conflict at the margins with no
basis, and then had used the cash to satisfy his obligation to the mortgagee. Although
acknowledging the tax benefit doctrine and cancellation of indebtedness balancing entry
affinity with Tufts, Justice Blackmun distinguished the doctrines on technicalities. Tufts,
461 U.S. at 310 n.8 ("Although the Crane rule has some affinity with the tax benefit rule,
the analysis we adopt is different. Our analysis applies even in the situation in which no
deductions are taken. It focuses on the obligation to repay and its subsequent extinguish-
ment, not on the taking and recovery of deductions"). The Commissioner also chose not
to characterize the transaction as cancellation of indebtedness. Id. at 311 n. 11 ("We are
not presented with and do not decide the contours of the cancellation-of-indebtedness
doctrine. We note only that our approach does not fall within certain prior interpretations
of that doctrine. In one view, the doctrine rests on the same initial premise as our analysis
here-an obligation to repay-but the doctrine relies on a freeing-of-assets theory to
attribute ordinary income to the debtor upon cancellation.").
95. See generally Boris I. Bittker & Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Income from the
Discharge of Indebtedness: The Progeny of United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 66 CAL.
L. REv. 1159 (1978).
96. See Hillsboro Nat'l Bank, 460 U.S. at 379-80 & n.11 (citing South Dakota
Concrete Products Co. v. Comm'r, 26 B.T.A. 1429, 1431 (1932)); Bittker & Kanner,
supra note 85, at 270-7 1.
97. BORIS I. BrrrKER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTs par. 5.7.4
(1st ed. 1981) ("Among these analogues to the tax benefit rule, the most important is
probably IRC § 1341."). I cite the 1st edition only to show Professor Bittker's early
recognition of the balancing entry affinity of all of these doctrines. See also Hillsboro
Nat'l Bank, 460 U.S. at 377 n.9, 381.
98. See United States v. Kirby Lumber, 284 U.S. 1, 3 (1931) (finding a cancellation
of indebtedness through the freeing up of assets); N. Am. Oil Consol. v. Burnet, 286 U.S.
417, 424 (1931) ("If in 1922 the Government had prevailed, and the company had been
obliged to refund the profits received in 1917, it would have been entitled to a deduction
from the profits of 1922, not from those of any earlier year."); Nat'l Bank of Commerce
v. Comm'r, 115 F.2d 875, 877 (9th Cir. 1940) (holding recovery of capital is a taxable
benefit); Crane v. Comm'r, 331 U.S. 1, 14 (1947) (equating amount realized and
economic benefit); United States v. Skelly Oil Co., 394 U.S. 678, 684 (1969) (holding
money refunded cannot be claimed as a deduction if not taxed when received). An
excellent articulation of the problems flowing from these legal fictions is provided by
Merkel v. Comm'r, 109 T.C. 463, 475 n.8 (1997), affd, 192 F.3d 844 (9th Cir. 1999)
(quoting Bittker & Thompson, supra note 95, at 1165):
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sound policy justification flowing from the particular legal fiction
originally articulated as the basis for finding (balancing entry) "income" or
a (balancing entry) "deduction" in year two. Each doctrine has been
codified, either in whole or in part, within the Code or the Regulations.
99
These common law tax rules all close year one on the best assumption
possible at that time with respect to a transaction's ultimate outcome, and
if the final development of the transaction in year two proves the original
assumption in year one erroneous, 10° the tax rules provide some type of
year two "balancing entry" adjustment to cancel out the closed year one
exclusion (the Crane-Tufts rule and the cancellation of indebtedness doc-
trine); closed year one deduction (the tax benefit rule and its progeny); or
the closed year one inclusion (year two balancing entry "deduction" under
the claim of right doctrine with the same character in year two under the
Arrowsmith doctrine 0 1 as the income reported in the year one closed
A particularly troublesome legacy of ... [the passage in Kirby Lumber
that the transaction "made available $137,521.30 assets previously
offset by the obligation of bonds now extinct"] has been the tendency
of some courts to read Kirby Lumber as holding that it is the freeing of
assets on the cancellation of indebtedness, rather than the cancellation
itself, that creates the taxable gain. Such reasoning misses the point.
Income results from the discharge of indebtedness because the taxpayer
received (and excluded from income) funds that he is no longer
required to pay back, not because assets are freed of offsetting
liabilities on the balance sheet.
99. See I.R.C. § 1245 (2006) (codifying Crane and requiring override of character of
gain defect under amount realized fiction through partial codification of tax benefit
doctrine); I.R.C. § 111 (2006) (codifying the National Bank of Commerce holding
regarding tax benefit doctrine); I.R.C. § 108(e) (2006) (codifying the Kirby Lumber
holding regarding cancellation of indebtedness); I.R.C. § 1341 (2006) (codifying tax
treatment when money is held under a claim of right and a repayment is made in year
two).
100. Hillsboro Nat'l Bank, 460 U.S. at 383 ("The basic purpose of the tax benefit rule
is to achieve rough transactional parity in tax ... and to protect the Government and the
taxpayer from the adverse effects of reporting a transaction on the basis of assumptions
that an event in a subsequent year proves to have been erroneous.").
Sometimes a subsequent event reveals the income or deductions as
reported by the taxpayer to be erroneous. Thus the unexpected recovery
of a portion of an amount lost and already deducted reduces the loss as
originally determined. There are even cases in which items apparently
finally and accurately determined have to be adjusted on account of a
subsequent event.
Id. at 387 n.22 (quoting H. Zysman, Income Derived from the Recovery of Deductions, 19
TAXES 29 (1941) (emphasis in original)).
101. Arrowsmith v. Comm'r, 344 U.S. 6 (1952). In Arrowsmith, two shareholders
liquidated a closely held corporation receiving liquidating distributions in years one
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transaction). In such balancing entry areas, a transaction is held open in
year one only when the year one assumption is very unlikely (e.g., non-
recourse acquisition liabilities in excess of fair market value or a reason-
able prospect of recovery as to a casualty loss). 10 2 An all-or-nothing open
or closed approach always prevails. A risk-adjusted year one reporting is
not available under these closed transaction based doctrines.I0 3 A year two
balancing entry is necessary to more clearly reflect the taxpayer's income.
The alternative transactional exception is to hold the transaction
'"open" in year one and defer reporting of a gain or loss/deduction or basis
until year two, when the final effect of the entire transaction is determin-
able. '0 The apparent standard for determining whether to open or close a
transaction in year one is based on the probabilities of the year two
event. 105 The reporting of the transaction in year two should retain the
through four. Id. at 7. The shareholders reported their gain as capital gain. Id. In year
eight a judgment was rendered against the liquidated corporation (and hence the share-
holders as transferees) and against one of the shareholders individually. Id. at 7-9. Each
of the shareholders paid half of the judgment and deducted the payments as an ordinary
business loss in year eight. Id. at 7. The two former shareholders of the liquidated corpor-
ation argued that their year two payment, as transferees of the liquidated corporation's
previously contingent liability, was ordinary income under "the well-established principle
that each taxable year is a separate unit for tax accounting purposes." Id. at 8.
Accordingly, they reasoned there was no sale or exchange in year two so that their loss
was ordinary. The Supreme Court held that the annual accounting principle was not
breached by considering the liquidation transaction events in years one and two together
in order to classify properly the nature of the liquidated corporation's former share-
holders' payment of the liquidated corporation's contingent liability in year two. Id. at 9.
No change was made to year one. Id.
102. See, e.g., Estate of Franklin v. Comm'r, 544 F.2d 1045, 1048 (9th Cir. 1977); cf.
Graf v. Comm'r, 80 T.C. 944,948 (1983); Zappo v. Comm'r, 81 T.C. 77, 88 (1980).
103. See Illinois Power Co. v. Comm'r, 792 F.2d 683, 690 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J.)
("In a world without administrative costs .... [t]he court would merely ask what the (risk
adjusted) present value of the receipt was, given the probability that it might have to be
returned to the payor and the terms and conditions under which the recipient could use
the money in the meantime, and the tax would be levied on that value. But this is not the
method used; usually the court just asks how likely is repayment, and if the answer is, not
very, the receipt is treated as income.").
104. For discussion of open transaction/deferred basis reporting as an alternative to
closing a transaction in year one with balancing adjustments in year two, see Lee &
Bader, supra note 37, at 173-86. Deferred basis reporting with constant character
constitutes a transactional exception to the annual accounting principle designed to reflect
the taxpayer's income more clearly. See id. at 173-79. Cases have not focused on open
transaction year two reporting and closed transactional year one reporting, with year two
transactional balancing entry as an alternative to handling contingent items.
105. See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 35,178 (Dec. 20, 1972) ("Since the contingent
stock right in this case probably was not susceptible to valuation at the time of the initial
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same character that it would have had in year one had it been completed in
year one. 106 Both gain and loss transactions can be so held open, with a
statutory variant as to gain an interesting legislative history limitation on
the case law. 10 7 Case law, in order to more clearly reflect income, also
exchange, and in any event was non-marketable, we think that the transaction in this case
clearly would have been treated as an 'open' transaction."); I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem.
7301220290A (Jan. 22, 1973) (same). Compare Ari J. Brandes, A Better Way to
Understand Credit Default Swaps, 120 TAx NOTES 235, 248 (2008) ("Analyzing whether
a straddle exists further illustrates why CDSs, which generally are structured to only
provide for payoff with a small probability, should be subject to open transaction treat-
ment."), with Merkel v. Comm'r, 192 F.3d 844, 850 (9th Cir. 1999). In applying insol-
vency exception to discharge of indebtedness income, (liabilities exceed fair market value
of assets), contingent liabilities are counted in the year of cancellation of any debt only if
the taxpayer can "prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she will be called
upon to pay an obligation claimed to be a liability and that the total amount of liabilities
so proved exceed the fair market value of his or her assets." Id. The Tax Court below had
reasoned that "[1]ogic dictates that an obligation to pay is a liability under the freeing-of-
assets theory only if it can be said with a satisfactory degree of certainty that the
obligation offsets assets. The critical inquiry, of course, is the level of certainty that is
satisfactory." Merkel v. Comm'r, 109 T.C. 463,475 (1997).
106. See Dorsey v. Comm'r, 49 T.C. 606, 628-29 & n.3 (1968); Robert J. Henry, The
Emerging Concept of Amount Realized: Results in Search of Reasons, 51 BROOK. L. REv.
41, 69 n.141 (1984); Lee & Bader supra note 37, at 208; Kilmer, Note, supra note 79, at
66-79.
107. See H.R. REP. No. 96-1042, at 21 (1980).
The creation of a statutory deferred payment option for all forms of
deferred payment sales significantly expands the availability of install-
ment reporting to include situations where it has not previously been
permitted. By providing an expanded statutory installment reporting
option, the Committee believes that in the future there should be little
incentive to devise convoluted forms of deferred payment obligations
to attempt to obtain deferred reporting. In any event, the effect of the
new rules is to reduce substantially the justification for treating trans-
actions as "open" and permitting the use of the cost-recovery method
sanctioned by Burnet v. Logan[,] 283 U.S. 404 (1931). Accordingly, it
is the Committee's intent that the cost-recovery method not be
available in the case of sales for a fixed price (whether the seller's
obligation is evidenced by a note, contractual promise, or otherwise),
and that its use be limited to those rare and extraordinary cases
involving sales for a contingent price where the fair market value of the
purchaser's obligation cannot reasonably be ascertained.
Id. This committee report was interpreting an amendment to Section 453. Logan, on the
other hand, was interpreting a predecessor to Section 1001, computation of amount
realized. During the tax years in question in Logan the predecessor to Section 453 had not
yet been enacted. It was enacted in 1926. See H.R. 1, 69th Cong. (1st Sess. 1926).
"[E]xpression of opinion by a subsequent Congress on the meaning of an act adopted by
an earlier Congress ha[s] little, if any, significance." Hart v. United States, 585 F.2d
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supplies a special rule for depreciation as to annual payments of purchase
price in an open transaction.1°8 Interest is not charged on the deferred tax
liability or refund under the judicial approaches. 
0 9
The claim of right doctrine requires a taxpayer to report as income in
year one amounts received in that year under a "claim of right." The
taxpayer in a subsequent tax year may end up repaying the amounts
reported in year one.'° If the taxpayer must make a repayment in year two
due to a fundamentally inconsistent event, articulated in this context as
repayment under the rubric of "compulsion" arising out of the same
circumstances, the doctrine grants the taxpayer a deduction in year two
rather than reopening year one."' Under the year two balancing entry
model, the year two repayment of an amount included in income in year
1025, 1032 (Ct. Cl. 1978); accord Santa Fe Pac. Gold Co. v. Comm'r, 130 T.C. 299, 314
(2008) (noting the "limited utility of using the views of a subsequent Congress to make
inferences as to the intent of an earlier Congress").
108. Associated Patentees, Inc. v. Comm'r, 4 T.C. 979, 985-87 (1945), acq., 1959-2
C.B. 3 (holding that payments in an amount which could not be determined until a later
year as the purchase price of a patent with a fixed useful life, with reasonable allowance
for depreciation was equivalent to the payment made in each year sanctioning deduction
for variable contingent payments); Rev. Rul. 67-136, 1967-1 C.B. 58 (agreeing to follow
the Associated Patentees decision); accord, Liquid Paper Corp. v. United States, 2 Cl. Ct.
284 (1983); Sarkes Tarzian, Inc. v. United States, 159 F. Supp. 253, 268 (S.D. Ind. 1958);
Newton Insert Co. v. Comm'r, 61 T.C. 570, 586 (1974), affd per curiam, 545 F.2d 1259
(9th Cir. 1976); Omholt v. Comm'r, 60 T.C. 541, 547 & n.6 (1973); Best Lock Corp. v.
Comm'r, 31 T.C. 1217, 1234 (1959). The deduction is allowed because the annual
royalty payments accurately reflect the annual cost of the patent. The total cost is
recovered over the useful life of the patent. Thus, there is a minimum distortion of
income. Newton Insert Co., 61 T.C. at 586. See the income forecast method of
depreciation under I.R.C. § 167(g) (2006), where future income can be estimated.
109. Lee & Bader, supra note 37, at 209.
110. See N. Am. Oil Consol. v. Bumet, 286 U.S. 417, 423-24 (1932). See generally
Harold Dubroff, The Claim of Right Doctrine, 40 TAX L. REv. 729, 733 (1985) (noting
that the three classic elements of the year one inclusion component of the doctrine are:
"(1) receipt by a taxpayer of money or other property, (2) control by the taxpayer over the
utilization or disposition of money or property, and (3) assertion of some claim of right or
entitlement by the taxpayer to receipt").
111. On several occasions, the Supreme Court has barred reopening year one with
respect to items repaid in year two because such reopening was violative of the annual
accounting principle; any deduction of amounts received under a claim of right in year
one would be allowed in the year of repayment (year two). See Healy v. Comm'r, 345
U.S. 278, 284-85 (1953); United States v. Lewis, 340 U.S. 590 (1951). See generally
Dubroff, supra note 110, at 730-31. Skelly Oil explained that the refusal to reopen year
one and instead allow a deduction in year two was "dictated by Congress' adoption of an
annual accounting system as an integral part of the tax code." United States v. Skelly Oil
Co., 394 U.S. 678, 681 (1969). The Court also properly saw Arrowsmith as related to this
year two balancing adjustment, i.e., supplying its character. Id. at 684-85.
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one, pursuant to the claim of right doctrine, requires a balancing entry
(i.e., a deduction) in year two in order to back out the item included in
income in year one, based on the assumption that the taxpayer would not
repay the item.
1 2
The earliest authorities mostly addressed the inclusion in year one of
amounts received in that year under a claim of right, and merely stated that
if the amount received in year one was repaid in year two the taxpayer
would be entitled to a deduction in year two. 113 Later claim of right year
two deduction cases turned the deductibility of the year two payment on
whether the taxpayer in year two was under an obligation to repay the
money. The Sixth Circuit, in United States v. Simon, pointed out that the
"word 'obligation' has been interpreted both liberally and strictly by the
courts." 114 Simon followed a strict construction of the term:
Taxpayers were undoubtedly motivated in entering into the agreement
with the corporation to reduce the lease rentals in order to eliminate any
future controversy with the Commissioner over excessive rentals. We
fail to see any business purpose in making the modification agreement
retroactive so as to provide for refunding of rentals already paid in a
prior tax year. The sole reason, in our judgment, was to obtain a tax
advantage either for the corporation, or taxpayers or both. This is not
sufficient to justify the deduction claimed as payment of an
"obligation" within the sense of claim of right. We agree ... that no
"obligation" arises from a voluntary agreement to repay monies which
112. Cf. Dubroff, supra note 110, at 749, n. 104 ("A reverse application of the [tax
benefit] doctrine could permit deduction of repayments of items previously included in
income."). This conclusion is implicit in Hillsboro Nat'l Bank's perception that the tax
benefit and claim of right doctrines are "analogous." 460 U.S. 370, 377 n.9 (1983) ("A
rule analogous to the tax benefit rule protects the taxpayer who is required to report
income received in one year under claim of right that he later ends up repaying. Under
that rule, he is allowed a deduction in the subsequent year."). Hillsboro Nat'l Bank
explained that the rationale of the tax benefit rule is that when a year two event is
fundamentally inconsistent with an assumption that underlies a year one deduction: "the
initial accounting for the [year one] item must be corrected to present a true picture of
income. While annual accounting precludes reopening the earlier year, it does not prevent
a less precise correction [a balancing entry]-far superior to none-in the current year
[two]." Id. at 378 n. 11.
113. N. Am. Oil Consol. v. Burnet, 286 U.S. 417, 423-24 (1932); I.R.S. Gen. Couns.
Mem. 16,730, XV-I C.B. 179, 181 (1936). On several occasions, the Supreme Court has
barred reopening year one with respect to items repaid in year two because such
reopening was violative of the annual accounting principle; any deduction of amounts
received under a claim of right in year one would be allowed in the year of repayment
(year two). See Healy v. Comm'r, 345 U.S. 278, 284-85 (1953); United States v. Lewis,
340 U.S. 590 (1951). See generally Dubroff, supra note 110, at 730-31.
114. United States v. Simon, 281 F.2d 520, 525 (6th Cir. 1960).
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the taxpayer would otherwise have an absolute and unconditional right
to retain." 5
The Tax Court in Berger v. Commissioner116 considered the applica-
tion of the claim of right year two deduction since the paid back compen-
sation was below the $3,000 floor amount that Section 1341 requires for
its applicability."I7 Following Simon, the Tax Court held that "there must
be the obligation to repay before the claim of right doctrine can be
invoked."' 18 Analyzing local law, Berger found that the corporation could
not have compelled in year two the officers to repay amounts of their year
one compensation that the Service determined in year two to be unreason-
able. Therefore, the repayment in year two was "voluntary [and] did not
give rise to any deduction under the 'claim-of-right doctrine."' 9 Thus,
payment pursuant to an obligation that first arose in year two should not
come under the deduction component of the claim of right doctrine. 120 The
"compulsion" requirement boils down to a perceived obligation. This
requirement may be contractual, legal, or based on a fundamental
115. Id. at 526.
116. 37 T.C. 1026 (1962).
117. Id. at 1028. The largest amount of officer compensation disallowed was $2,400.
Id. Section 1341 is applicable only if the amount of year two income which the taxpayer
repays in year two exceeds $3,000. I.R.C. § 1341(a)(3) (2006).
118. Berger, 37 T.C. at 1029.
119. Id. at 1031. Berger, approvingly quoted the above passage in the text from Simon.
Id. The Tax Court in Adams v. Commissioner, followed Berger and Simon in applying the
claim of right year two deduction. 58 T.C. 41, 53-54 (1972). The year one contract under
which advance royalties were paid "specifically provided that money paid and unearned
was to be returned. The return by Wyoming was not voluntary." Id. at 64. I.R.S. Gen.
Couns. Mem. 16,730, XV-I C.B. 179 (1936), approved the proposition that where income
received under claim of right is properly reported in income for the years in which
received and subsequently paid back as required, the taxpayer is entitled to a deduction
for the amount of such payment for the year in which it was paid. See also Healy v.
Comm'r, 345 U.S. 278 (1953); United States v. Lewis, 340 U.S. 590 (1951). In applying
this proposition, the following criteria must be met. First, the taxpayer must receive funds
under a claim of right which are taxable in the year of receipt. Healy, 345 U.S. at 281-82.
Second, the petitioner must show that the payee could have legally compelled the
repayment: "The great weight of authority is that the payee must have at least the ability
to legally compel the repayments before the repayments can be deducted by the payor."
Berger, 37 T.C. at 1032. Third, the taxpayer must establish that a deduction is allowable
for the year of repayment. See United States v. Skelly Oil Co., 394 U.S. 678, 683 (1969);
Simon, 281 F.2d at 526. Finally, the taxpayer must show that the repayment was actually
made. See Maxwell v. United States, 334 F.2d 181, 184 (5th Cir. 1964).
120. See Adams, 58 T.C. at 53-54. Where the payback contract was not entered into
until year two, the payback would not have arisen out of circumstances, terms and
conditions of the year one payment. Id.
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assumption existing in year one at the time of the receipt of the item to
repay the amount if the year one assumption turned out in year two to be
erroneous. 
121
The Supreme Court, in Skelly Oil, alluded to the issue of whether a
year two deduction for a repayment of an item reported previously under
the claim of right doctrine in year one arose under a specific Code
provision; however, the Court did not decide whether the provision was
Section 162 or Section 165.122 Not surprisingly, a number of subsequent
decisions incorrectly sought to fit the year two balancing entry into the
mold of a Section 162 business expense or Section 165 business loss.
12 3
Although not articulated in these terms, in Arrowsmith,124 the year two
capital loss (from a former shareholder's transferee liability arising from a
liquidated corporation's contingent liability) was really a year two claim
of right deduction of the same character as the year one "overstated"
capital gain reduced in year two for the transferee liability then paid.
Although taxpayers at times have sought to deduct the repayment as an
expense and there is no indication of a disinclination to allow the
deduction as such, ... the deduction is generally allowed as a loss ...
with the nature of the income when received determining whether the
loss be capital or ordinary. 1
25
2. Statutory Version: Section 1341
The 1954 Internal Revenue Code introduced Section 1341, which
partially affects transactional reporting. It grants a covered taxpayer a year
two adjustment to taxes owed for that year for his year two "involuntary"
repayment of an item when in year one "it appeared that [he] had an
121. Dubroff, supra note 110, at 753-55; cf. Pennzoil-Quaker State Co. v. United
States, 511 F.3d 1365, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Prost, J., concurring) ("I read no
requirement that the item itself qualify for a deduction, but rather understand the statute
to require only that the deduction be a result of a change in the taxpayer's right to the
item.").
122. Skelly Oil, 394 U.S. at 683-84 (assuming deductibility of customer refunds as
either business expense under I.R.C. § 162 or loss under § 165). This assumption over-
looks the year two payments in Arrowsmith which, since backing out an over-reported
capital gain (not reduced for the contingent transferee liability) were deductible as capital
losses under § 1211. See I.R.C. § 165(f) (2006).
123. See, e.g., Bailey v. Comm'r, 756 F.2d 44, 46 (6th Cir. 1985) ("Before invoking §
1341, the taxpayer must be entitled under some provision of the Internal Revenue Code
to a deduction for the restoration payment in that year.").
124. Arrowsmith v. Comm'r, 344 U.S. 6 (1952).
125. Nat'l Life and Accident Ins. Co. v. United States, 244 F. Supp. 135, 139 (M.D.
Tenn. 1965), affd 385 F.2d 832 (6th Cir. 1967) (citations omitted).
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unrestricted right to such item." 126 This adjustment is calculated at a level
that is equal to the greater of his year one or year two marginal bracket
and rate.127 No interest is credited to the taxpayer from year one.
128
Statutory conditions for the application of Section 1341 are:
(1) an item must have been included in the taxpayer's gross income
for a prior year because it appeared that the taxpayer had an
unrestricted right to that item;
(2) a deduction must be allowable for a later year because it was
established after the close of the prior year that the taxpayer did
not have an unrestricted right to the item;
(3) the amount of the allowable deduction must exceed $3,000;129 and
(4) the item must not arise by reason of the sale of inventory type
property, other than by a regulated public utility.
30
I believe that the first two requirements were intended to codify the
requirements of the common law claim of right doctrine with the added
requirement that the year one payment not be illegal income-to which
the taxpayer would never have an unrestricted right.
The legislative history to Section 1341 shows that Congress intended it
to apply to circumstances such as those presented in United States v. Lewis
and Arrowsmith v. Commissioner.13 ' Lewis, which involved inaccurate
126. I.R.C. § 1341(a)(1) (2006).
127. Id. I.R.C. § 1341 provides that the year two tax is the lesser of the tax computed
with a deduction for the year two repayment or the tax for the current year computed
without the deduction minus the tax savings that would have resulted if the income under
the claim of right had not been included in the prior year. Id. One commentator criticizes
the availability of using the tax rates for either the prior or current year:
[There is no] sound policy reason for providing a windfall to the chance
taxpayer who finds that a deduction in the restoration year will result in
greater tax savings. Rather to achieve conceptual consistency and
assure fairness among taxpayers, the transaction should be viewed as a
whole and the taxpayer required to adjust his prior year's tax liability,
thereby receiving as a refund or credit only that amount which he
actually overpaid.
Lee & Bader, supra note 37, at 211 n.461. This commentator advocates that year one
should be reopened while the model suggests instead a transactional balancing entry in
year two. In Hillsboro Nat'l Bank, Justice O'Connor supported a year two adjustment.
460 U.S. 370, 377 (1983). In dissent, Justice Blackmun advocated reopening year one in
certain circumstances. Id. at 425 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See generally Dubroff, supra
note 110, at 730-31 (discussing alternatives).
128. See John G. Corlew, Note, Tax Benefit Rule, Claim of Right Restorations and
Annual Accounting: A Cure for the Inconsistencies, 21 VAND. L. REV. 995, 1013 (1968).
129. See Nat'l Life and Accident Ins. Co., 244 F. Supp. at 141.
130. I.R.C. § 1341(b) (2006).
131. See H.R. Rep. No. 83-1337, at A294 (1954).
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computation, 132 and Arrowsmith, which involved transferee liability, and
capital loss backed out over reported capital gain in year one,1 are
explainable as balancing entry cases; backing out year one erroneous
assumptions with a year two loss of the same character as the year one
income. In Lewis, the taxpayer was paid a bonus for 1944 (based on the
corporate employer's pre-tax profits) which he reported on March 15,
1945.134 In March 1945, the corporate employer filed its 1944 return
reporting the same bonus as a deduction, but later, in 1945, filed an
amended return claiming the bonus as a deduction in a lesser amount
(based upon profits after taxes).135 Sometime after the 1944 corporate tax
return had been filed, the corporation discharged the taxpayer and in
ensuing litigation, filed a counter-claim, claiming that the bonus should
have been based on profits after taxes. 136 On December 3, 1946, judgment
was entered in the corporation's favor, finding that
the agreement for 1944 was that the bonus should be computed on the
profits after deduction for taxes and that plaintiff erroneously and
mistakenly believed and understood that the bonus was to be computed
before deduction of taxes, and that by virtue of this mistake plaintiff
received for the year 1944 the sum of $10,856.06 in excess of the
[If] the amount of the deduction is in excess of $3,000, the tax for the
subsequent year is reduced by either the tax attributable to the
deduction or the decrease in the tax for the prior year attributable to the
removal of the item, whichever is greater. Under the rule of the Lewis
case (340 U.S. 590 (1951)), the taxpayer is entitled to a deduction only
in the year of repayment.... The section will apply to cases of trans-
feree liability such as Arrowsmith v. Commissioner (344 U.S. 6
(1952)). Thus, while the deduction in the current year is capital in
nature, the taxpayer is not deprived of all relief because his tax is re-
duced at least to the extent of the tax attributable to the prior inclusion.
Id.; see also S. Rep. No. 83-1622, at 451 (1954) (similar); United States v. Skelly Oil Co.,
394 U.S. 678, 694 n.3 (1969); Culley v. United States, 222 F.3d 1331, 1334 (Fed. Cir.
2000) ("As an alternative to a deduction (e.g., as a capital loss) in the year of repayment,
§ 1341 permits certain taxpayers to reduce their taxes in the year of repayment by the
amount of additional tax paid in the year of receipt due to the amount in question."). "In
sum, § 1341 is designed to put the taxpayer in essentially the same position he would
have been in had he never received the returned income." Dominion Res., Inc. v. United
States, 219 F.3d 359, 363 (4th Cir. 2000).
132. Lewis v. United States, 91 F. Supp. 1017, 1019 (1950), rev'd, 340 U.S. 590
(1951).
133. Arrowsmith v. Comm'r, 344 U.S. 6 (1952).
134. Lewis, 91 F. Supp. at 1017-18.
135. Id. at 1018-19.
136. Id. at 1019.
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amount to which he was entitled under the agreement as found by the
court. 1
37
In Arrowsmith, the shareholders of a liquidating corporation which
dealt in securities received a series of liquidating distributions in 1937,
1938, 1939, and 1940.138 In June 1939, the estate of a joint venturer with
the corporation in a trading account commenced an action alleging that the
corporation, in breach of its fiduciary duty, dealt on its own account with
stock contributed by the joint venturer to the trading account.139 The joint
venturer obtained a judgment against the liquidated corporation and its
former shareholders as transferees in March 1942, which was affirmed on
August 1, 1944.140
The above chronologies of Lewis and Arrowsmith show that at the end
of year one, no claim had been lodged disputing the amount reported in
year one-which the Service implies is a prerequisite for application of
Section 1341 .141 The correct approach is whether the year two establish-
ment of the lack of an unrestricted right to the income arises "'out of the
circumstances, terms and conditions of the original payment of such item
to the taxpayer. ' , ' 142 The clearest example is Pahl v. Commissioner, where
the taxpayer was allowed a Section 1341 year two adjustment for repay-
ment to his corporate employer of the "unreasonable" portion of comp-
ensation paid after execution of a contract obligating him to make such
repayments upon a determination by the Service of such unreason-
ableness.143 However, Pahl was denied a Section 1341 adjustment for year
two repayments of the amount of "unreasonable" compensation paid to
him before execution of such contract (which had a retroactive feature
covering pre-execution payments to the employee). 144 Thus, the better
137. Id.
138. Arrowsmith, 344 U.S. at 7.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. The question of whether an actual claim of right can qualify as an apparent one
under the statute has caused some disagreement in the federal courts. Compare Dominion
Res., 219 F.3d 359 (holding that a taxpayer may qualify for Section 1341 treatment even
if, during the year of receipt, he did in fact have an actual right to the item of income),
with Cinergy Corp. v. United States, 55 Fed. Cl. 489, 505 (2003) (holding that Section
1341 treatment presupposes that the taxpayer's right to was "apparent," not "actual," in
the year of receipt), and Alcoa, Inc. v. United States, 509 F.3d 173, 178 n.5 (3d Cir.
2007).
142. Dominion Res., 219 F.3d at 367 (quoting Pahl v. Comm'r, 67 T.C. 286, 290
(1976)).
143. 67 T.C. at 289-9 1.
144. Id.
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view is that Section 1341 applies to: (1) implicit contingencies present in
year one, including a beneficiary's year two repayment to a trust, under a
year two court order of excessive year one distributions of trust income
due to a miscalculation undercounting trust expenses; 145 (2) (critically in
the context of a year two repayment by AIG executives of a year one
bonus) a year two disgorgement of year one insider trading profits in
settlement of a Securities and Exchange Commission proceeding; 146 and,
(3) year two restoration to customers by public utility of rate overcharges
arising from year one charges reflecting projected liability for federal
corporate income taxes at the 46% rate when the rate was reduced to
34%. 
147
a. Legal Fiction
The legal fiction under the case law and statutory claim of right
doctrine' 4 is basing the year two deduction on an explicit Code section,
viz., Section 162 or 165.149 I believe that the year two deduction is an
extra-Code deduction that is made to cancel out the item reported as
income in year one in order to more clearly reflect income. This legal
fiction as to year two deductions under the claim of right doctrine is most
starkly revealed by the line of modem cases considering paybacks of un-
145. Prince v. United States, 610 F.2d 350, 352 (5th Cir. 1980).
146. See supra note 29 discussing facts of Barrett v. Comm'r. While the Service
argues the nexus between the year one payment and year two repayment was not shown,
see I.R.S. action on dec. 1992-08 (Apr. 6, 1992). The facts in note 29 supra show that
this is also ludicrous.
147. Dominion Res., 219 F.3d at 364.
148. See Lee & Bader, supra note 37, at 210 ("The claim of right doctrine requires a
taxpayer to report as income in year [one] amounts received in that year under a 'claim of
right.' The taxpayer later may end up repaying the amounts reported in year [one].").
The three classic elements of the year one inclusion component of the doctrine are: "(1)
receipt by a taxpayer of money or other property, (2) control by the taxpayer over the
utilization or disposition of money or property, and (3) assertion of some claim of right or
entitlement by the taxpayer to receipt." Dubroff, supra note 110, at 733. Professor
Dubroff believes that the third element may no longer be necessary. Id. Dominion Res.,
Inc. 219 F.3d at 364, lends credence to this view.
149. See, e.g., United States v. Skelly Oil, Co., 394 U.S. 678, 683-84 (1969); I.R.S.
Gen. Couns. Mem. 33,602 (Aug. 25, 1967) ("It has long been recognized that any party
who restores funds that he initially received and held under a claim of right will thereby
become entitled to take a business expense deduction for the year in which the repayment
transaction is actually carried out."); accord, Cinergy Corp. v. United States, 55 Fed. Cl.
489, 509 (2003) ("[T]o qualify for section 1341 relief, a taxpayer must be authorized to
deduct the item at issue under some other provision of the Code.").
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reasonable compensation. 150 The Tax Court in Oswald v. Commissioner,
allowed the deduction of a payback of "unreasonable compensation"
pursuant to a binding obligation (bylaw) entered into prior to the
taxpayer's earning the compensation after Service disallowance.1 51 The
court reasoned that employer compulsion rendered the repayment
deductible.1 52 The Service followed this reasoning in Revenue Ruling 69-
115.153 The Tax Court, in contrast, allows no deduction for such repay-
ments if the repayment contract was entered into after the close of year
one. 154 Yet, there is the same employer compulsion to follow the bylaw or
150. Some, but not all, courts view entering into a payback agreement as an indicia of
unreasonable compensation. See, e.g., Charles Schneider & Co., Inc. v. Comm'r, 500
F.2d 148, 155 (8th Cir. 1974) ("An element reflecting on the intent of the parties as to the
potential effect of these agreements is the fact that the bylaws of these corporations were
amended shortly after the agreements were adopted to require the employees to repay to
the companies amounts which they received under the agreements but which were later
declared by a court not to be deductible expenses for tax purposes.... This may reflect a
pre-existing knowledge on the part of the taxpayers that the payments would not be
reasonable for tax purposes, and could lead to an inference as to their intent."); Saia
Electric, Inc. v. Comm'r, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 1357 (1974) (discussing addendum to
contract of corporate president obligating reimbursement to corporation of excessive or
unreasonable payments). Contra Menard, Inc. v. Comnim'r, 560 F.3d 620, 624 (7th Cir.
2009) (Posner, J.) ("Given the fondness of the IRS and the Tax Court for a 'totality of the
circumstances' approach to determining excessive compensation, it was prudent ... for
the company to require him to reimburse it should the IRS successfully [deny] the
deduction."). See generally Dubroff, supra note 110, at 754-55 & n.131.
151. 49 T.C. 645 (1968), acq. 1968-2 C.B. 2.
152. Id. at 647-48. Oswald returned the $5,000 after receiving legal advice that the
bylaw was enforceable and the repayment was necessary. If he had not repaid it, it could
have been withheld from his later salary. It was a deductible expense of his business as an
officer of Electric [Manufacturing & Repair Co.] under the circumstances of its return to
Electric. Id. at 648.
153. 1969-1 C.B. 50. The Service has since expressed unhappiness with this position
when the employee controls the corporation with no minority unrelated interest. See
I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 35,557 (Nov. 8, 1973); I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 35,484 (Sept.
17, 1973). IRS General Counsel Memo 35,484 holds that no deduction is allowable under
a repayment agreement where there exists no substantial adverse interest. The more
sound approach would be to require a business purpose for the arrangement, not just a tax
reduction. This approach was rejected in Van Cleave v. United States, 718 F.2d 193 (6th
Cir. 1983). See infra note 159.
154. See infra note 265 discussing Pahl v. Comm'r, 67 T.C. 286 (1976). In Pahl the
court held that taxpayer was not entitled under either Section 1341(a) or 162(a) to a
deduction for the 1972 restoration of amounts attributable to the period prior to the
execution of the Dec. 14, 1970 agreement, but was entitled to a deduction for the repay-
ment of amounts attributable to the period after Dec. 13, 1970. Id. at 289-90. The
distinction to the Pahl court was as follows:
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contractual terms.155 Judicial analysis finding that if the repayment agree-
ment is executed after the year one payment, repayment in year two is
voluntary, is conclusory, and ignores the business necessity of obeying the
agreement regardless of the date of entry into the agreement.1 56 Indeed, on
very similar facts, the Service had earlier ruled that Section 1341 was not
available as to any repayment because the shareholder-employee had an
absolute right to the compensation in the year of payment; 157 "repayment
was subject to a condition subsequent, an audit." 158 The better analysis is
to ask whether there was a business purpose for the repayment, e.g. to help
As to the deductibility of the 1972 restoration, a distinction must be
made between the amounts petitioner received prior to the execution of
the contract on December 14, 1970, and the amounts received after that
date. At the time petitioner received the pre-December 14, 1970,
payments (totaling $318,248.01), he had no obligation to restore them
regardless of whether K-P-F was allowed deductions for them. Rather
petitioner had an unrestricted right to his salary payments for 1969 and
1970 received prior to December 14, 1970, and to the incentive
compensation for all of 1969 and the first three quarters of 1970 when
they were received. This right was not qualified by any circumstances,
terms, or conditions existing at the time of the receipt of those sums.
His subsequent contingent voluntary agreement of December 14, 1970,
required, in part, that petitioner reimburse his employer for any of the
already-received amounts that were, at some future date, disallowed as
income tax deductions to his employer. Such agreement, however, will
not support a 1972 deduction for his repayments to K-P-F in that year
of the excessive amounts totaling $318,248.01 received before
December 14, 1970.
Id. (emphasis added); see also Blanton v. Comm'r, 46 T.C. 527 (1966), aff'd, per curiam,
379 F.2d 558 (5th Cir. 1967); Berger v. Comm'r, 37 T.C. 1026, 1031 (1962) (holding that
repayment by taxpayers in 1956 of a portion of their salaries for prior years was
voluntary and did not give rise to any deduction under the claim of right doctrine where
payback agreement entered into after IRS audit).
155. The Service disagrees, see supra note 153. This is why some courts use the term
"voluntary."
156. See Menard, Inc. v. Comm'r, 560 F.3d 620 (7th Cir. 2009); see also infra notes
159-61 and accompanying text.
157. Rev. Rul. 67-437, 1967-2 C.B. 296 ("If the instant taxpayers in a subsequent year
should repay the disallowed amounts to the corporation, it will not be because it was
established after the close of the prior taxable year in which the money was received that
the taxpayers did not have an unrestricted right thereto in such prior year, but because a
liability on their part has later accrued which does not in any way establish that they had
no right to the money when received."). The payback agreement appears to have been in
place before any compensation subject to it was paid.
158. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,429 (Feb. 24, 1978); accord Rev. Rul. 67-48, 1967-1
C.B. 50.
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maintain the employee's business reputation, or instead just a tax avoid-
ance purpose.
No deduction under Section 1341 or the common law claim of right
doctrine is correct under a balancing entry "fundamentally inconsistent
event" analysis as to paybacks of amounts paid in year one and paid back
under contracts entered into after year one. Unless the payback contract
was in place in year one at the time the "unreasonable compensation" was
received, no assumption is made (i.e., that the salary would not have to be
repaid), that has to be reversed in year two. Following Hillsboro's
inconsistent event analysis (assume for the sake of analysis all events
occur within year one), a payback in year one with no contractual or other
binding obligation would be voluntary (typically a contribution to
capital). 16 Under the Oswald Section 162 compulsion analysis, a deduc-
tion would be supportable: had the payback, pursuant to an obligation,
occurred in year one, a deduction would have offset the income. 161 Thus,
one triggering event for a claim of right deduction often imported into
Section 1341, is a year two payment pursuant to compulsion, the legal or
contractual basis for which was in place in year one.16 The Tax Court has
indicated that compulsion of a legal requirement is too rigid; voluntary tax
159. Van Cleave v. United States, 718 F.2d 193 (6th Cir. 1983). In Van Cleve, the
Service contended that taxpayer was only entitled to a deduction in the year he repaid the
compensation, because he had more than a mere appearance of an unrestricted right to the
income in the year it was received. Id. at 196. The district court agreed. Id. at 195. On
appeal, the 6th Circuit reversed, holding that taxpayer was entitled to the benefit of
Section 1341, even though he had an unrestricted right to the income in the year received,
and it was only in the following year that his right to the money became restricted. Id. at
197.
160. See Quinn v. Comm'r, 524 F.2d 617, 624 (7th Cir. 1975) (discussing necessity to
business of being officer of corporation to obey by-law).
161. See Oswald v. Comm'r, 49 T.C. 645 648-49 (1968). But see Blanton v. Comm'r,
46 T.C. 527, 530-31 (1966), aff'd, per curiam, 379 F.2d 558 (5th Cir. 1967).
According to the circumstances, terms, and conditions of the original
payments of director's fees to petitioner, petitioner was never obligated
at any time to return any portion of said fees to the corporation. It was
only after petitioner received the director's fees that he voluntarily
entered into the repayment contract which may or may not have been
binding upon him. However, the fact that the contract may have been
binding upon petitioner does not change the essentially voluntary
nature of his decision to enter into it.
Id. at 530.
162. See Dubroff, supra note 110, at 753; Lee & Bader, supra note 37, at 210 & n.459;
see also I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 35,557 (Nov. 8, 1973).
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avoidance is not sufficient, but external events virtually mandating repay-
ment may trigger Section 1341.163
The Service's stance that a subsequent unfulfilled year two condition
does not trigger Section 1341 is incorrect. 164 Another fault in the Service's
position is that it believes the claim of right doctrine applies in year one
even though "continued enjoyment of such funds is subject to a restriction
which is merely 'potential or dormant' in the sense of being dependent
upon a possible future application of rules of law to present facts."
16 5
Further, if the restriction comes into play within the same tax year and the
taxpayer makes restitution in that year, "such restitution necessarily pre-
cludes the realization of any overall net income."' 166 And, if the taxpayer
makes repayment in year two he or she "will thereby become entitled to
take a business expense deduction for the year in which the repayment
transaction is actually carried out."' 167 Clearly, if the common law claim of
right doctrine's year two deduction for repayments applied, the taxpayer
would be able to use Section 1341.
Authorities disagree as to whether Section 1341 applies when the
taxpayer in year one had an absolute or actual right to the item of income
rather than only an apparent right. The Service frequently argues that
where the taxpayer's right to income becomes restricted only upon the
occurrence of an event in year two, the unrestricted right in year one is
more than apparent-it is actual, and Section 1341 is unavailable. 168 The
Service maintains that the year two events must show that the taxpayer did
not have an unrestricted right at the end of year one, thus the year two
facts must show that the taxpayer's right was only apparent as of the end
of year one.169 If this were interpreted as only requiring a contingent
obligation in year one to make the year two repayment if certain
163. Barrett v. Comm'r, 96 T.C. 713, 722 (1991).
164. Rev. Rul. 67-437, 1967-2 C.B. 296; contra Van Cleave, 718 F.2d 193.
165. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,602 (Aug. 25, 1967).
166. Id.
167. Id. (relying on N. Am. Oil Consol. v. Burnet, 286 U.S. 417 (1932), and Pike v.
Comm'r, 44 T.C. 787 (1965), for claim of right and early BTA salary adjustment cases,
and United States v. Merrill, 211 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1954), for year-end netting).
Where both the initial receipt of funds and the repayment of some
portion thereof take place in the same year, there cannot very well be a
serious question about the overall propriety of excluding the amount so
repaid from the taxable income of the party who has thus effectively
relinquished or disavowed any claim thereto.
Id.
168. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 33,602 (Aug. 25, 1967).
169. See Van Cleave, 718 F.2d at 197; see also supra note 153.
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assumptions in year one turn out in year two to be erroneous, it is
supported by case law, legislative history, and the balancing entry model.
The Service has conceded that neither Section 1341 nor the accompanying
regulations address
whether the determination that the taxpayer did not have an unrestricted
right to the income in question has to be based on facts that existed as
of the close of the taxable year in which the taxpayer received the
income, or could instead be based on events that occurred after the
close of the taxable year of receipt.17
0
The Service still maintains that the former position is the correct one, but
no court presented with this argument has adopted it.17 1 The Claims Court
disagreed with Dominion Resources in Cinergy Corp. v. United States:
"[T]he claim of right doctrine simply does not apply where an individual
receives an item of income under an 'absolute' right.,1 72 The true debate is
whether a taxpayer only appears to have an absolute right to an item of
income where, in the year of receipt, there is an implicit condition sub-
sequent which will require a repayment in year two if certain facts come to
pass in that year so that the condition is not fulfilled. In Dominion
Resources, the condition subsequent was that the deferred taxes for which
a reserve was held would not be reduced by an income tax rate
decrease. 173
Although DRI's right to keep the income was not explicitly conditioned
on the tax rate remaining at 46%, from the outset the tax rate was an
obvious and central circumstance under which the regulatory
170. Dominion Res., Inc. v. United States, 219 F.3d 359, 364 (4th Cir. 2000) (referring
to the Commissioner's brief). IRS relies not on a regulation but rather on a small group of
revenue rulings now more than thirty years old. See Rev. Rul. 69-115, 1969-1 C.B. 50;
Rev. Rul. 67-437, 1967-2 C.B. 296; Rev. Rul. 67-48, 1967-1 C.B. 50; Rev. Rul. 58-456,
1958-2 C.B. 415; Rev. Rul. 58-226, 1958-1 C.B. 318. Id. at 366.
171. See id. at 366 ("Although the tax court has on occasion denied certain taxpayers
the right to avail themselves of § 1341, it has never adopted the IRS's distinction between
actual versus apparent claims of right as the basis for such decisions.... Moreover, both
circuits that have considered a similar IRS contention with respect to § 1341(a) have
flatly rejected it."); Prince v. United States, 610 F.2d 350, 352 (5th Cir. 1980) ("The basis
of the district court's decision and of the government's position on this appeal is that the
section is inapplicable here because Margaret Bush had an actual unrestricted right to the
trust income in question, and not just an appearance of such a right.... The Alabama
judgment established, whether expressly or by implication, that the deductions from the
trust income for the ten year fee had been miscalculated. As a result, Margaret Bush had
received more income from the trust than she was entitled to receive. This income had to
be returned. The requirements of Section 1341 were thus clearly satisfied.").
172. 55 Fed. Cl. 489, 503-04 (Fed. Cl. 2003).
173. Dominion Res., 219 F.3d at 368.
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authorities permitted DRI to collect the $10 million. As one DRI
official testified, "our expectation was all along that if there was any
excess [collection for] deferred taxes resulting from the tax decrease
that those amounts would be refunded to customers or returned to
customers." Certainly anyone familiar with public utility regulation
would have shared that expectation.
174
The Claims Court in Cinergy refused to find such a condition
subsequent.'
75
The Fourth Circuit, in Dominion Resources, pointed to the proper non-
statutory requirement (supported by the balancing entry model and
implicit in the cases discussed immediately below): "the requisite lack of
an unrestricted right to an income item permitting deduction must arise out
of the circumstances, terms, and conditions of the original payment of
such item to the taxpayer."' 176 The court's application of this test was,
however, quite liberal.17 7 "It did 'appear that' DRI had an unrestricted
right to the income, and it was established in a later year that DRI did not
have an unrestricted right to that same item of income." 178 A literal
reading of this formulation supports application of Section 1341 to a 2009
repayment of a bonus received in 2008.
Functionally, the applicability of a Dominion Resources implicit
condition precedent should turn on whether, at the time of the payment of
retention bonuses in December 2008 by a TARP beneficiary, Congress
and the media had already expressed sufficient opposition to such bonuses
that, while the right to keep the bonuses was not expressly conditioned on
a low level of political and popular opposition, rescission was a strong
possibility if existing criticism escalated. In fact, at the time that AIG paid
the bonuses in 2008, politicians and the media had already expressed the
desirability of a cap on bonuses in general, and especially criticized AIG's
retention bonuses to executives.' 79 A demand for repayment by AIG made
by Federal or State governments if the bonuses were paid was perhaps not
as inevitable as was the required repayment in Dominion Resources of part
174. Id.
175. Cinergy, 55 Fed. Cl. at 506-07 (2003) ("[T]his is not a case where a utility
obtained funds in one year based upon a mistaken calculation or the seeming triggering of
a condition precedent later found not to have occurred.").
176. Dominion Res., 219 F.3d at 367 (quoting Pahl v. Comm'r, 67 T.C. 286, 290
(1976)).
177. Dominion Resources accurately concluded that Congress intended Section 1341
as a remedial statute. Id. at 362-63. Such remedial provisions are given a liberal interpret-
ation. See Koss v. United States, 69 F.3d 705, 709 (3d Cir. 1995).
178. Dominion Res., 219 F.3d at 368.
179. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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of a reserve for future income taxes if future income rates were reduced
from the year one rates.18 0 On the other hand, the 2008 AIG facts are close
to those in Penn v. Robertson, which permitted tax rescission within the
same year when a bonus was challenged in a shareholder derivative suit
filed contemporaneously with the payment. 11 Similarly, a year two pay-
ment by a broker to settle civil suits brought in year two warranted
application of Section 1341.182
Assuming, therefore, that Section 1341 applies to any repayment in
2009 of executive bonuses paid in 2008, two additional points arise: (1) if
application of the alternative computation restoration creates a greater
reduction in 2008 taxes than the 2009 taxes computed without the
deduction in 2009 of the restoration (as it likely would), such excess
creates a NOL carry-back offsetting the 2008 taxes on the bonus, and
hence an instant refund of those taxes in 2009;183 and (2) to the extent
additional FICA (Federal Insurance Contribution Act) taxes (including
social security and Medicare taxes) were paid in the prior year because of
the erroneous salary payment, the repayment of the salary in a subsequent
year creates an overpayment of FICA taxes in the prior year, and credit
may be claimed by the employer with respect to its FICA tax liability for
that prior year subject to the statute of limitations.'
8 4
180. Dominion Res., 219 F.3d at 368.
181. Penn v. Robertson, 115 F.2d 167, 169-72 (4th Cir. 1940); see also infra notes 204
and 210 and accompanying text.
182. See supra note 29 discussing Barrett v. Comm'r, 96 T.C. 713 (1991).
183. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,606 (Sep. 10, 1970); see I.R.C. § 1341(b)(1) (2006)
(excess of decrease in tax for year one arising from excluding year one payment restored
over taxes for year two computed without deduction for repayment, is treated as if
overpayment for year two and is refunded (or, if elected, credited towards year three
taxes)).
184. I.R.S.S.C.A. 1998026 (Significant Service Center Advice Re: Wage
Overpayment Taxability) (Dec. 4, 1998); see also id. ("Repayments of salary received in
a prior year do not reduce the amount of wages paid to the employee for FICA and
federal income tax withholding purposes in the year of the repayment. Thus, any
remuneration for employment in the year of repayment which is used to repay the
erroneous salary is not excludable from wages for FICA and federal income tax
withholding purposes. Also, the repayment of salary does not reduce gross income for the
prior year or affect the amount of income tax withheld in the prior year."); Rev. Rul. 79-
311, 1979-2 C.B. 25; I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. Mem. 200129001 (Mar. 20, 2001).
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b. Rescission or Netting at Year End
Strict and liberal lines of authorities also conflict as to taxation of a
payment and of its repayment in the same year.' 85 The "strict view" is that
if the taxpayer-employee receives the payment without restrictions or
conditions subsequent and the employee's repayment within the same year
could not be required under local law by the employer, the payment must
be included in the employee's income under a claim of right. Moreover,
the repayment within the same year is often held to be personal and,
hence, non-deductible.' 86 The liberal view is that, where prior to the close
of the taxable year, the contract or obligation is adjusted and the taxpayer-
employee repays the amount received, the tax liability is to be determined
on the basis of the adjusted amount.
1 87
The better, but seldom recognized, dichotomy is between those author-
ities requiring the existence of a condition subsequent that would mandate
repayment if the condition is met at the initial time payment is due,' 88 and
those authorities that do not require the condition. The seminal liberal
cases would have yielded the same result under the strict view, viz., either
a mistake as to amount,189 because subsequent events in the same tax year
that constituted an express condition subsequent requiring repayment, or
the presence at the time of payment of developments that might induce the
corporation and employee to rescind the payment and restore the status
185. See United States v. Simon, 281 F.2d 520, 525 (6th Cir. 1960).
Where the individuals received the funds under claim of right and in
subsequent years came under obligation to repay the money, they are
entitled to deductions in the year of repayment. The Government
accedes to the correctness of this statement, but contends that "it has
absolutely no application where a taxpayer returns to the payer income
which he has received in an earlier year when there is no legal or moral
obligation requiring its return. The word "obligation" has been
interpreted both liberally and strictly by the courts.
Id.; see also I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,606, at 2-3 (Sep. 10, 1970) (liberal
interpretation of Section 1341).
186. The reason for the repayment invariably was for income tax savings, which is not
a business purpose. See, e.g., Nat'l Life and Accident Ins. Co. v. United States, 244 F.
Supp. 135, 138 (M.D. Tenn. 1965) (citing United States v. Simon, 281 F.2d 520 (6th Cir.
1960); Crellin's Estate v. Comm'r, 203 F.2d 812 (9th Cir. 1953)), afJfd 385 F.2d 832 (6th
Cir. 1967).
187. See infra notes 22948 and accompanying text.
188. For example, this could be a mistake of fact or an explicit or implicit requirement
of repayment if a specified condition subsequent, such as a suit demanding rescission of
the payment, occurs before year end.
189. The Service came to oppose a condition subsequent as not satisfying Section
1341. See supra notes 168-69 and accompanying text.
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quo ante.' 90 The lines of liberal cases came, however, to encompass re-
imbursement of payments that had been made without any of these
factors-permitting undoing within the same year of any payments, even
if repayment was prompted by subsequent tax purposes of the corporation
or the employee.
The most frequently cited decisions in this context are: (1) Crellin's
Estate v. Commissioner;191 (2) United States v. Merrill;192 (3) Penn v.
Robertson;193 and (4) Couch v. Commissioner.194 Crellin's Estate held
that, where a dividend is received under a claim of right without restriction
on its use, and in the same year the corporation and shareholders
"rescinded" the dividend paid, due to a mistake of tax law, 195 the
rescission did not compel the return of the dividend payments.
96
Repayment in such case was a "voluntary act" which "cannot create a de-
duction in any year." 197 The court concluded that, "for tax purposes, it is
that which the holding company could have compelled, not that in which
the stockholders were willing to acquiesce, which controls. Otherwise, the
taxpayers in this case could lift the federal tax-hand; to suit their
convenience." 198
The Tax Court followed Crellin's Estate in finding that the corporation
could not have legally compelled restoration of parts of salaries paid in
prior years; hence, the shareholder-employee repayment was "voluntary"
190. Penn v. Robertson, 115 F.2d 167, 173 (4th Cir. 1940).
191. 203 F.2d 812 (9th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 873 (1953).
192. 211 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1954) (60 citing decisions, many distinguishing or
criticizing).
193. 115 F.2d 167 (4th Cir. 1940) (49 citing decisions).
194. 1 B.T.A. 103 (1924), acq., 1925-1 C.B. 1 (39 citing decisions).
195. Crellin's Estate, 203 F.2d at 813. The board declared a dividend following err-
oneous advice that income, unless distributed, would be subject to the personal holding
company surtax. Id. Later in the same year it learned that such advice was erroneous and
believing that a recall of the dividends would decrease the taxable income of the stock-
holders and permit an advantageous investment by the corporation of the returned
distributions, the corporation passed a resolution "rescinding" the dividend and demand-
ing that the stockholders return the amounts paid to them. Id. The stockholders complied
before the end of the year. Id.
196. Id. at 814.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 815. The passage quoted in Crellin's Estate stated in full that "it is not
given to a taxpayer to lift the federal tax-hand from income, which he has once received
in absolute right, by an attempt thereafter to alter its legal status through modification of
the agreement out of which it arose." Leicht v. Comm'r, 137 F.2d 433, 435 (8th Cir.
1943) (holding that amounts received as salary cannot be retroactively changed during
the same year by the modification of the salary agreement or by resolution of the board of
directors of a corporation).
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and "did not give rise to any deduction under the 'claim-of-right doc-
trine." ' 199 These voluntary cases tend to involve retroactive (within the tax
year or even after the close of the tax year) rescissions or obligations to
repay that are motivated by tax avoidance, or at least reduction of the
corporation's and/or the individual taxpayer's federal income taxes.2°
In United States v. Merrill,20' the Ninth Circuit held that where a
taxpayer had mistakenly paid executor's fees to himself from his late
spouse's estate for two years and discovered the mistake in the second
year, the fees paid by the estate in the first year had to be reported under
the claim of right doctrine. 20 2 As to the second year, however, the claim of
right doctrine was inapplicable and the erroneous fees were excluded from
gross income because "in the same year that the funds [were] mistakenly
received, the taxpayer discover[ed] and admit[ted] the mistake,
199. Berger v. Comm'r, 37 T.C. 1026, 1031 (1962); id. at 1032 ("Petitioners make
some argument on brief that in order to come under the claim-of-right rule it is not
necessary that repayment be made under a 'legal compulsion' but that it is enough if the
repayment is made 'in good faith and in the exercise of a sound business judgment.'
There is no merit in this argument. It can readily be seen such a 'sound business
judgment' standard would allow the employee-stockholders to contribute capital to their
corporation by the mere label of excessive salary repayment, and secure deduction of the
contribution on their own returns. The great weight of authority is that the payee must
have at least the ability to legally compel the repayments before the repayments can be
deducted by the payor."); cf. Barrett v. Comm'r, 96 T.C. 713, 719 (1991), non-acq.,
1992-1 C.B. 1 (following Berger but holding that "[t]o conclude that petitioner restored
the $54,400 voluntarily without regard to any legal obligation would, in our view, be
ludicrous. The SEC had initiated administrative proceedings in which it presumably
sought, among other things, to compel a restoration of all of petitioner's option trading
profit as well as the removal of his license as a broker. Petitioner along with others had
been sued for $10 million. A hearing had been held in those suits before a U.S. magistrate
who, it appears, was of the view that the plaintiffs could present sufficient evidence to
require submission of the matter to a trial court jury. The magistrate urged the parties to
settle the suits. With several other defendants involved, petitioner could not have known
what evidence would be presented at a trial. He could not have known how the jury
would view his own testimony and that of others on the circumstances in which he
bought and sold the options. At this point, petitioner settled the suits and restored the
$54,400. All of these facts clearly indicate that the settlement was made in good faith and
at arm's length; there is no evidence to the contrary, and respondent does not suggest that
the settlement was collusive. The settlement, whether or not embodied in a judgment,
established the fact and the amount of petitioner's legal obligation."). Non-acquiescence
was based on a failure in the record to show this nexus. I.R.S. action on dec., 1992-08
(Mar. 13, 1992).
200. See Oswald v. Conim'r, 49 T.C. 648 (1968).
201. 211 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1954).
202. Id. at 304.
TAX TARP NEEDED FOR RETURNED BONUS
renounce[d] his claim to the funds, and recognize[d] his obligation to
repay them." 20 3
In Penn v. Robertson,2° 4 a corporation sold to executives in January
1931 shares of its stock at a price less than 25% of fair market value. 205 A
shareholder derivative suit was filed within two weeks, another within two
months, and another within nine months.20 6 On the advice of counsel, the
corporation rescinded the plan before the end of the year.20 7 In the
rescission the taxpayer's estate returned the stock and $31,500 in credited
dividends to the corporation-all before the end of 1931.208 "The whole
transaction was thus consummated within the calendar year 1931 on the
basis of no profit and no loss to either Penn or the [corporation]. 209 Penn
held that the rescission in 1931 before the close of the year, "extinguished
what otherwise would have been taxable income to Penn for that year."
210
Note that in this case challenges to the payments were raised contempor-
aneously with the payments.
Finally, Couch v. Commissioner, one of the earliest Board of Tax
Appeals decisions, held that where the taxpayer-employee and the
corporation reduced the amount of his compensation before the end of the
203. Id. The court went on to conclude that:
[T]here is no warrant for extending the harsh claim of right doctrine to
such a situation. In such case the Internal Revenue Bureau is not faced
with the problem of deciding the merits of the claim to the funds
received, for the question has been resolved by the interested parties.
No question is here raised as to the bona fides of appellee's 1940
bookkeeping entries relative to the mistaken payments. Good faith is
indicated by the fact that the taxpayer's $7500 obligation to the estate
was not only recognized by him in 1940 but was paid in cash in 1943.
Id.; accord Clark v. Comm'r, 11 T.C. 672 (1984), non-acq., 1949-1 C.B. 5, acq., 1954-1
C.B. 3 (amounts of salary employee agreed before end of year to repay not taxable even
though repayment not made by time of decision). The Service has also held that that a
taxpayer does not have an "absolute right" to income under the accrual method of
accounting where an error is discovered within the same tax year. Rev. Rul. 2003-10,
2003-1 C.B. 288.
204. 115 F.2d 167 (4th Cir. 1940).
205. Id. at 170. The stock was held in trust with dividends to be applied to the
purchase price. Id.
206. Id. at 171. Contemporaneously, dividends of $31,500 were credited to the
taxpayer. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 175.
211. 1 B.T.A. 103 (1924) acq., 1925-1 C.B. 1.
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tax year due to its "straightened financial circumstances," he was to be
taxed only on the reduced amount.
212
Though seemingly at odds, these seminal cases are all reconcilable. In
Crellin's Estate, when the taxpayer received the dividend, the amount was
not in error, and the receipt was not subject to challenge. The purported
rescission was because the dividend payment had been based upon err-
oneous tax advice.
2 13
In Merrill, the taxpayer received the executer's fee from his deceased
spouse's estate erroneously and corrected the error within the same tax
year by acknowledging the error and agreeing to pay the fee back to the
estate. This is similar to the error in Lewis as to the amount of the
bonus.
215
In Penn, when the taxpayer was credited with $31,500, the employer's
plan was being challenged in the courts contemporaneously so that the
taxpayer was aware that he and the corporation might be compelled to
rescind the payment. 2 16 Similarly, Revenue Ruling 80-58, relying on thePenn rescission doctrine, held that no gain is recognized under Section
212. Id. at 103
213. Crellin's Estate v. Comm'r, 203 F.2d 812, 814 (1953).
214. United States v. Merrill, 211 F.2d 297, 298-99 (9th Cir. 1954); see also
Hightower v. Comm'r, 90 T.C.M. (CCH) 530 (2005), affd, 266 Fed. Appx. 646 (9th Cir.
2008) (discussing how Merrill "held that a payment mistakenly made to a taxpayer who
had no right to receive it is not taxable in the year of receipt if, in that year, the taxpayer
renounces any claim to the funds, recognizes an obligation to repay, and makes provision
for repayment in the form of a journal entry on the taxpayer's books"). Of course, merely
agreeing today to pay back the erroneous amount would not back out the original receipt;
the taxpayer would have to pay it back in the same tax year. See Quinn v. Comm'r, 524
F.2d 617, 624, 626 (7th Cir. 1975) ("Merrill was incorrectly decided.... Thus, recognition
of the obligation to repay funds received under a claim of right has no tax consequences
regardless of whether it occurs in the year the funds were received or a later year.");
accord Buff v. Comm'r, 496 F.2d 847, 849 (2d Cir. 1974) (Oakes, J., concurring)
("Merrill runs contrary to the theory underlying the concept of annual accounting, at least
in the case of cash basis taxpayers.... In short, giving credence in the case of a cash basis
taxpayer to an agreement to repay, whether in the same year of receipt, is a gross misuse
of the annual accounting concept; a repayment agreement per se should be viewed as a
nullity for tax purposes."). The Service has not always recognized this error in Merrill.
See, e.g., I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. Mem. 200124008 (Mar. 14, 2001). But see Davis v.
United States, 226 F.2d 331, 334 (6th Cir. 1955). This subsequent obligation to repay
may be distinguished from a situation where the taxpayer had no right to keep the money
when received and has an obligation to pay it to another. See Comm'r v. Indianapolis
Power & Light, Co., 493 U.S. 203 (1990).
215. United States v. Lewis, 340 U.S. 590 (1951) (deciding case where taxpayer who
received and reported improperly computed bonus in 1944 repaid erroneous amount in
1946 after losing in employer's suit to recover such amount).
216. Penn v. Robertson, 115 F.2d 167, 171 (1940).
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1001 on the sale of land where, pursuant to a condition precedent clause in
the contract of sale, the taxpayer accepts reconveyance of it and returns
the buyer's payment in the year of sale.
In Couch, the compensation contract was modified before the compen-
sation was received. The Board relied heavily on the good faith of the
employee and the corporation and in effect found a condition subsequent:
Salary arrangements between corporations and their principal stock-
holders and managers in cases like this one, where the manager is
expected by his associates to protect the interests and the future
prospects of the company even at a sacrifice to himself, are and must be
at all times subject to such modifications as may be made by agreement
from time to time; and it appears to us that the arrangement entered into
by this taxpayer and this corporation in the month of December, 1920,
clearly shows an intent on the part of both sides to modify the prior
existing agreements in regard to this taxpayer's compensation, and that
such modification was actually made in good faith and the accounts of
the company adjusted accordingly.21 8
The Tax Court in Jones v. Commissioner accurately read Couch and its
early progeny: "the original salary agreements present in each of these
cases were found to be subject to modification by the taxpayers and their
employers and not absolute." 
219
i. Evolution of Rescission and Year End Netting Cases
The Tax Court in Bishop v. Commissioner220 applied Merrill to a fact
pattern in a manner that more closely resembled Penn than a mistake
regarding the payment amount. In Bishop, a "minority stockholder of a
corporation" claimed that the majority shareholders, "who were partners in
two other businesses were conducting their partnership businesses in a
manner detrimental to the corporation." 221 The majority settled the suit by
turning over the partnership income to the corporation in the year it was
217. Rev. Rul. 80-85, 1980-1 C.B. 181. This notion of implicit or explicit condition
subsequent underlying the Penn rescisson within the same year doctrine may explain the
citation in I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 38,241 (Jan. 8, 1980) to Penn, as well as Healy, as
authorities for the claim of right doctrine holding "that where a taxpayer has the un-
restricted use of income in a taxable year, he is taxed on that income." I.R.S. Gen. Couns.
Mem. 38,241, supra.
218. Couch v. Comm'r, 1 B.T.A. 103, 105 (1924).
219. 82 T.C. 586, 591 (1984); accord McEwen v. Comm'r, 6 T.C. 1018, 1025 (1946).
220. 25 T.C. 969 (1956), acq., 1956-2 C.B. 3. The claim of right doctrine does not
apply if the taxpayer renounces any right to the income, either before or immediately
after receiving it. Id. at 974.
221. Id. at 969.
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received, thereby renouncing their claim of right to such income, which
the court held resulted in no taxable income to them. 222 The Tax Court,
however, has recently distinguished Merrill where there is no mistake as
223to the original payment. In contrast, the Second Circuit readily followed
Merrill where "the duty to return was pre-existing and adherent to the
payment itself, and [the] payment and return were simultaneous. ' '224 The
222. Id. at 974-75; accord Rev. Rul. 58-456, 1958-2 C.B. 415.
223. Hightower v. Comm'r, 90 T.C.M. (CCH) 530 (2005) (holding that the case
differed from Merrill "because the payment of funds was not a mistake, [taxpayer] had
the right to receive the funds, and there was no existing agreement ... to return the
payment"), affd, 266 Fed. Appx. 646 (9th Cir. 2008) cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 518 (2008);
accord I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 33,602 (Aug. 25, 1967):
There are likewise persuasive precedents for concluding that a cash
basis taxpayer can avoid having the so-called claim of right doctrine
applied against him with respect to funds mistakenly received as
income during a particular taxable year without actually restoring such
funds to their rightful owner in the same year he receives them, if he is
sufficiently prompt in clearly renouncing any claim thereto. It was
directly so held in United States v. Merrill, 211 F.2d 297 (9th Cir.
1954) where an executor who had initially collected an excessive fee
from an estate in both 1939 and 1940 discovered his mistake after
having received the full fee originally contemplated and thereupon
acknowledged an obligation to restore more than his last year's
collections by making appropriate entries to that effect during 1940 on
both the estate's books of account and his own personal books. Both
the Tax Court and Fifth Circuit appear to be in accord with the result
reached in this Merrill case. See Charles Kay Bishop, 25 T.C. 969
(1956) (Acq. C.B. 1956-1, 3) and Commissioner v. Gaddy, 344 F.2d
460 (5th Cir. 1965).
Id.
224. Frelbro Corp. v. Comm'r, 315 F.2d 784, 787 (2d Cir. 1963).
[A] taxpayer, who by mistake consummates a transaction in a manner
that is not in accord with his actual intent, may, in the same tax year,
with the consent of the other parties, reform the transaction so as to
carry out his real intent, and ... such reformation will determine the
federal tax consequences.
Davis v. United States, 378 F. Supp. 579, 582 (N.D. Tex. 1974); I.R.S. action on dec.,
1975-135 (May 13, 1975) ("We believe that this decision [Davis] is in conflict with the
subsequent decision of Commissioner v. Buff, 496 F.2d 847 (2d Cir. 1974), rev'd 58 T.C.
224 (1972). While the majority of the court in Buff distinguished Merrill, the concurring
opinion of Justice Oakes held that Merrill was incorrect because a cash-basis taxpayer
who receives money in one year and merely renounces his claim to the money and
promises repayment in the same year is not entitled to an offsetting deduction until he
actually makes repayment. Based upon this rationale Mr. Davis would be entitled to no
deduction in 1964 but would be entitled to a deduction upon repayment of his notes in
1965.").
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Service has often (usually in dicta) broadly stated this principle based on
the renunciation exception to the claim of right doctrine, namely, that:
[t]he claim of right doctrine will not apply if the taxpayer renounces
any right to the income, either before or immediately after receiving it.
Also, for the renouncement to be effective, the right to the income must
be renounced and the income repaid during the taxable year in which
the money is received.225
Really this just proves that where repayment is made in the same year as a
payment that was subject to an explicit or implied condition subsequent,
the claim of right doctrine does not apply to the initial payment.226 Thus,
the blogger who called any AIG executive who agreed to pay back part of
his or her retention bonus a "sucker" started off with an erroneous assump-
tion of an "absolute right."227 The bloggers appear to have achieved their
apparent goal of retarding paychecks since Liddy implied that employees
were not returning any of their retention bonuses "pending resolution of
certain tax implications.'
228
ii. Penn Progeny
Again, loose language indicates that the rescission exception to the
claim of right doctrine may apply without a mistake or condition sub-
sequent, explicit or implicit, at the time of receipt of a payment, so long as
rescission is agreed upon prior to year end and the parties are returned to
status quo ante.
[T]wo conditions that must be satisfied for the remedy of rescission to
apply to prevent current recognition of gain from the disposition of a
capital asset: (1) the parties to the transaction must return to the status
quo ante; that is, they must be restored to "the relative positions they
would have occupied had no contract been made;" and (2) this
restoration must be achieved within the taxable year of sale.
230
225. I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. Mem., 1998 FSA LEXIS 190 (1998) (citations omitted)
(relying on Bishop v. Comm'r, 25 T.C. 969 (1956)).
226. Jones v. Comm'r, 82 T.C. 586, 591 (1984).
227. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
228. See House AIG Hearing, supra note 4, at 324.
229. See, e.g., Hope v. Comm'r, 55 T.C. 1020, 1031 (1971) (stating, in dictum that
"[t]his Court is not faced with the situation where the sale is rescinded in the same year"
where a suit for rescission was filed due to dissatisfaction with the sales price), afftd, 471
F.2d 738 (3d Cir. 1973); accord Hightower v. Comm'r, 90 T.C.M. (CCH) 530 (2005),
afTd, 266 Fed. Appx. 646 (9th Cir. 2008).
230. I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. Mem., 1994 FSA LEXIS 596 (Nov. 23, 1994) (citing
Penn v. Robertson, 115 F.2d 167 (4th Cir. 1940), and Rev. Rul. 80-58, 1980-1 C.B. 181).
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The Service relied upon Penn in Revenue Ruling 80-58.231 The ruling
held that a sale of property was subject to rescission at any time during the
nine months following the purchase by the buyer if he could not obtain
rezoning for his business use.232 The rescission 233 placed the buyer and
seller in the same positions at the end of the tax year as they were in prior
to the sale.2 3 4 As stated by the Service, "the original sale is to be disregard-
ed for federal income tax purposes because the rescission extinguished any
taxable income for that year with regard to that transaction.
'" 235
The Service, in General Counsel Memorandum 39,690236 analyzed
Revenue Ruling 80-58 as involving a condition subsequent which, if not
fulfilled, would allow a buyer to obtain rescission of the purchase.
237
Further progeny of this ruling came to simply require restoration to the
same position by year's end for rescission disregarding a transaction with-
out any condition subsequent. 238 None, however, involved compensation.
231. Rev. Rul. 80-58, 1980-1 C.B. 181.
232. Id.
233. Id. The legal concept of rescission refers to the abrogation, cancelling, or voiding
of a contract that has the effect of releasing the contracting parties from further
obligations to each other and restoring the parties to the relative positions that they would
have occupied had no contract been made. A rescission may be effected by mutual
agreement of the parties, by one of the parties declaring a rescission of the contract
without the consent of the other if sufficient grounds exist, or by applying to the court for
a decree of rescission. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,690 (Jan. 15, 1988).
237. Accord I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 94-08-004 (Nov. 10, 1993); I.R.S. Field Serv.
Adv. Mem., 1994 FSA LEXIS 782 (July 14, 1994) (revaluation clause).
238. See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200-752-035 (Sept. 26, 2007). Before an S
corporation sponsoring an employee stock purchase program under which employees
could buy its stock had been advised that such stock could not be held by an individual
retirement account (IRA), it permitted an employee's IRA to purchase stock under the
program. Id. When its counsel advised it that an IRA was an ineligible shareholder, it
rescinded the transaction, voiding the certificates representing stock issued to the IRA,
and reissuing the same to the employee. Id. The Service ruled that because the rescission
satisfied the requirements detailed in Rev. Rul. 80-58, 1980-1 C.B. 181, the S corporation
was entitled to relief from the inadvertent termination of its S corporation status. Id.; see
also I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200-752-025 (Dec. 28, 2007); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200-701-
019 (Jan. 5,2007).
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iii. Couch Progeny
In the earliest progeny of Couch, the compensation had been repaid by
the end of the tax year of payment with the taxpayer-employee carefully
couching the facts to include an "understanding" between the corporation
and the employee: the employee would return part of his salary if the
business could not pay the contractual amount due to business circum-
stances. 239 Thirteen years after Couch, at the beginning of the Great
Depression, cases began to allow taxpayers to exclude returned salary
from gross income prior to the end of the year even though the repayment
agreement was made after the compensation had already been paid. 4  In
Curran Realty Co. v. Commissioner, the taxpayer and its tenant, following
a tax audit of the tenant, reduced before the end of the current tax year the
amount of rent owed to the taxpayer to the amount of "reasonable" rent
allowed by the audit.24 1 The lessor-taxpayer made an adjusting entry to its
financial record before the end of the tax year but refunded the excess to
the tenant in the next tax year.242 The taxpayer was allowed to exclude
such excess from income in the current tax year.243 A year end adjustment
239. See Fulton v. Comm'r, 11 B.T.A. 641 (1928) (describing fact pattern where an
"officer of a corporation during a taxable year return[ed] to the corporation" before the
end of a tax year "part of salary received for the year [pursuant to] an agreement" with a
majority of preferred shareholders "to accept less salary if the business [did] not warrant
his regular salary, [the amount of salary] so returned [is not] includ[ible] in his gross
income"); Hill v. Comm'r, 3 B.T.A. 761, 763 (1926) ("We are convinced from the
evidence that there was an understanding among the officers and directors of the
corporation that salaries should be set at the highest possible point in the hope that the
business would justify them, but if unexpected claims developed, thereby reducing the
income of the corporation, the officers would refund a portion thereof. All of the officers
and directors of the corporation were active in the conduct of its business and interested
in its success."). Jones v. Comm'r, 82 T.C. 586, 591 (1984), read Hill as a case where
"the original salary agreement[] present ... [was] found to be subject to modification by
the taxpayers and their employers and not absolute." Id. The same is true of Fulton.
240. Russel v. Comm'r, 35 B.T.A. 602, 603-04 (1937), acq. 1937-1 C.B. 22 ("The
petitioner [president and director of Detroit Bevel Gear Co.] suggested that, in view of
the showing which had been made by the company during the year 1930, his salary was
excessive and should be reduced to $4,200 per year, which was agreed to by Jenks and
Navin. Thereupon, the petitioner delivered to the company his check dated December 23,
1930, payable to the order of the company in the amount of $4,800, which amount
included one-half of the salary previously received by him.").
241. 15 T.C. 341, 342 (1950), acq., 1951-1 C.B. 2, non-acq., 1954-1 C.B. 8.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 343-44. But see Buff v. Comm'r, 496 F.2d 847, 850 n.2 (2d Cir. 1974)
(Oakes, J., concurring) ("I do not find Curran ... in any way persuasive from an
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was also held to limit the corporation's compensation deduction to the
adjusted amount. 2 "
By the 1940s the Tax Court had come to flatly stating the rule as
follows:
[C]ompensation for services of officers of corporations for any period
is subject to modification either by corporate action or by agreement at
any time and from time to time during the taxable year and the amount
at which compensation is finally adjusted at the close of the taxable
year is the amount which the officer must report as compensation or the
corporation may deduct as ordinary and necessary business expense.
245
The Tax Court has applied this exception to modifications where the pay-
ment of compensation was neither in error nor subject to conditions
subsequent.246 Similarly, the Service often flatly states the rule to be that
a taxpayer's gross income includes the amount of compensation set
forth in a renegotiated employment contract rather than the amount of
compensation set forth in an original employment contract where the
renegotiated employment contract is bona fide and legally binding on
the parties. Furthermore, the Board of Tax Appeals, the Tax Court, and
the Service are generally in agreement that the renegotiated employ-
ment contract must be executed and the resulting salary adjustments
must be implemented prior to the close of the taxpayer's taxable
year.247
accounting viewpoint; it seemed to reach the Merrill result without even mentioning the
claim of right rule or any exception thereto.").
244. See Stern-Slegman-Prins Co. v. Comm'r, 79 F.2d 289, 292 (8th Cir. 1935); Basen
Steel Works v. United States, 52-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9439 (1952).
245. McEwen v. Comm'r, 6 T.C. 1018, 1025 (1946) (discussing the holdings in Stern-
Slegman-Prins, Russell, Fulton, and Couch).
246. Fender Sales, Inc. v. Comm'r. 22 T.C.M. (CCH) 550 (1963) ("This Court has
adopted and consistently followed the legal proposition that where prior to the close of
the taxable year there has been an adjustment of the contract or obligation and a
repayment of a portion of the amount received, the tax liability is to be determined on the
basis of such adjusted amount."), rev'd on other grounds, 338 F.2d 924, 929 (9th Cir.
1964) ("[D]ischarge by a corporation of its salary obligations to any [shareholder-
employees] ... by the issuance of the corporat[e] capital stock ... [were] payment[s] and
realization of income by the [shareholder-employees].).
247. I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. Mem., 1994 FSA LEXIS 5 (Oct. 18, 1994) (finding,
however, that the "contract was renegotiated prior to the rendering of services by the
minister and ... the renegotiated employment contract was otherwise bona fide and legally
binding on the parties") (emphasis added); see also Rev. Rul. 79-311, 1979-2 C.B. 25
("[A]dvances in the instant case were income to A and B at the time of receipt, they were
subject to the deductions for FICA employee tax and withholding for federal income tax.
The company was also required to pay the employer's share of FICA tax and the FUTA
tax on such wages. In the instant case, neither A nor B performed the services that entitled
them to retain the excess commissions, and pursuant to their contractual obligation each
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The Service reasoned that,
[w]here both the initial receipt of funds and the repayment of some
portion thereof take place in the same year, there cannot very well be a
serious question about the overall propriety of excluding the amount so
repaid from the taxable income of the party who has thus effectively
relinquished or disavowed any claim thereto.248
Crellin's Estate, while technically dealing with rescission, 24 holds to
the contrary.
When a dividend has been declared and paid, it is income to the
recipient shareholder. This is true even if the recipient shareholder
immediately restores the amounts he has received to the distributing
company pursuant to a prior agreement, by his own initiative, or upon
request of the issuing board of directors.25 °
It in effect looks to whether the recipient of a payment had an absolute or
vested right at the time of receipt. Crellin's Estate frequently has been
cited as a claim of right case. Other decisions cite it for the broader
proposition that the compulsion required for a claim of right deduction
demands a showing of "at least the probable validity of the adverse claim
to the funds repaid. 252 Some reconcile Crellin's Estate and Merrill by
applying the former to dividends and the latter to compensation.
25 3
repaid the excess commissions to their employer at the termination of their employment.
A repaid the excess commissions to the employer in the same year in which A received
such commissions. Accordingly, the excess commissions repaid by A were excludable
from A's gross income in the year of repayment."); I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. Mem., 1994
FSA LEXIS 485 (Apr. 5, 1994).
248. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 33,602 (Aug. 25, 1967) ("This is evident from the 'cash
basis' salary adjustment case of Albert W. Ressell [sic], 35 B.T.A. 602 (1937) (Acq. C.B.
1937-1, 22), wherein it was held that the corporate officer concerned had 'actually
received' no more than a certain net amount 'as salary' in the taxable year at issue. The
transfer of a bona fide demand note in satisfaction of a similar salary adjustment has also
been held to have this same result for a cash basis taxpayer. Willis W. Clark, 11 T.C. 675
(1948) (Acq. C.B. 1953-1, 3)."); accord I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,893 (June 1, 1972).
249. Frelbro read Crellin as a claim of right case. Frelbro Corp. v. Comm'r, 315 F.2d
784, 786 n.3 (2d Cir. 1963); accord Kappel v. United States, 437 F.2d 1222, 1226 (3d
Cir. 1970); United States v. Simon, 281 F.2d 520, 525 (6th Cir. 1960) (Crellin favoring
"stricter interpretation of obligation"); Drybrough v. Comm'r, 238 F.2d 735, 740 n.5 (6th
Cir. 1956).
250. Chapman v. Comm'r, 82 T.C.M. (P-H) 307 (1982); see also Pahl v. Commn'r, 67
T.C. 286, 292 (1976).
251. See, e.g., Drybrough, 238 F.2d at 740 n.5; I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,893 (June
1, 1972) (considering Rev. Rul. 73-511 and citing Merrill and Crellin's Estate as both
involving income received under a claim of right).
252. Pike v. Comm'r, 44 T.C. 787, 799 (1965); see also Berger v. Comm'r, 37 T.C.
1026, 1031-32 (1962) (citing Crellin's Estate as "much like" the case at hand involving
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Under both the rescission in year one and returning compensation
authorities, the better view requires an explicit or perhaps implicit condi-
tion subsequent which, if it occurs and the parties undo the original trans-
action putting themselves in the status quo ante, the initial transaction is
disregarded for federal income tax purposes.
254
As to "retention" bonuses paid in March 2009, the political 2 5 and pop-
ular criticism 256 was much more widespread than in 2008, and the demand
of repayment by the executives soon (certainly before the end of 2009)
257was explicit. 5
I've said before that paying excessive bonuses to the same group of
folks that helped get us into this crisis is simply unacceptable. Millions
repayment of excess salaries in subsequent year after tax audit determined that excess
was unreasonable compensation.). See the discussion from the original Oswald, supra
note 38. On the other hand, I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. Mem., 1991 FSA LEXIS 4 (Oct. 28,
1991) distinguished a salary repayment before year end from repayment of a dividend
before year end.
253. See I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. Mem., 2001-124-008 (Mar. 14, 2001). "[A] dividend
once legally declared by the corporation's board of directors cannot be revoked." Id.
"[Yet] in the same taxable year of receipt a taxpayer realizes that a payment was received
in error, an acknowledgment of an obligation to repay prevents the need for recognition."
Id. (citing Merrill). The rationale is probably that state corporate law may have strict
rules as to rescission of a dividend once declared, treating it as vested so that the
corporation has no authority to rescind it. See Crellin's Estate v. Comm'r, 203 F.2d 812,
815 (1953) ("[For tax purposes, it is that which the holding company could have
compelled, not that in which the stockholders were willing to acquiesce, which
controls.").
254. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
255. See, e.g., Chuck O'Toole, House Vote on AIG Bonus Surtax Imminent, TAX
NOTES TODAY, Mar. 19, 2009, at 51-1 ("H.R. 1586[] would impose a 90 percent
[personal] income surtax on [unreturned] employee bonuses, ... define[d] as 'any
retention payment, incentive payment, or other bonus which is in addition to any amount
payable to such individual for service performed by such individual at a regular hourly,
daily, weekly, monthly, or similar periodic rate.' The surtax would only apply to em-
ployees ... with more than $250,000 in adjusted gross income ... whose companies have
accepted at least $5 billion from the federal government through Treasury's Troubled
Asset Relief Program [TARP]."); see also News Release, supra note 6 ("Senate Finance
Committee Chairman Max Baucus (D-Mont.), Ranking Member Chuck Grassley (R-
Iowa), Senator Ron Wyden (D-OR), and Senator Olympia Snowe (R-ME) today intro-
duced the Compensation Fairness Act of 2009, legislation to discourage excessive
compensation by companies that have taken taxpayer funds, and recoup payments made
to executives at recipient institutions of funds from the Troubled Assets Relief Program
(TARP). For companies that received TARP funds, the legislation would impose a 35
percent excise tax on both employers and employees, on retention bonuses and other
bonuses.").
256. See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text.
257. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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of Americans continue to struggle to get by, counting their dollars, and
Congress needs to do the same. We need to track Federal dollars now
more than ever .... We must act quickly on this proposal-for the sake
of the American taxpayer, for the sake of what's right to do. I will work
with my colleagues in both the House and Senate to make sure that's
what happens.
For example, House Ways & Means Committee Chair Charles Rangel,
D-N.Y., summed up the feelings of many regarding the AIG bonuses
during the floor debate on H.R. 1586, taxing Executive Bonuses paid by
companies receiving TARP assistance:
Most all Americans believe that a bonus is something that is paid as a
reward for a job well done. And certainly we don't believe in the House
that when a handful of people receiving taxpayers' money for threat-
ening the community in which we live, and indeed our country and the
financial structure of the world, the whole idea that they should be
rewarded millions of dollars is repugnant to everything that decent
people believe in. But notwithstanding that, it is not our job to tell the
private sector what to do; it is our job to say you don't do it at tax-
payers' expense.
All this bill does is just pull out that part that they called bonus.
And if you received, or the company received, $5 billion of taxpayers'
money, we say the tax that you will pay on this is 90 percent. The rest
of your income would be at the regular rate of 35 percent. If, indeed,
this combination of the so-called bonus reward is combined with the
regular salary and reaches a cap of $250,000, only the regular 35
percent would count.
Maybe somewhere along the line someone might say, "I don't
deserve this, we've caused enough damage, people have lost their jobs,
their savings, they've lost their homes, their health insurance, they've
lost their dignity, they've lost their pride, and we don't deserve to take
this money from the taxpayers." Then give it back, don't receive it, and
the law certainly would not apply. But if you're proud of what you've
done, we are saying the buck is going to stop here, the red light is
258. News Release, supra note 6 (statement of Max Bacus, S. Fin. Comm. Chairman,
D-Mont.); see also Brett Ferguson, Baucus Pledges Action on Bill to Recover Bonuses at
Companies Receiving TARP Funds, DAILY TAX REPORT, Apr. 1, 2009, at G-3 ("Grassley
suggested that because many of the employees who received bonuses were not still
working at the company, they were improperly labeled as retention bonuses and were, in
fact, performance-based pay that guaranteed executives would get the money even
though they knew 2008 and 2009 would be unprofitable years."); id. ("Senate legislation
(S. 651) would impose excise taxes of 70 percent on certain 'excessive executive
compensation' at firms receiving TARP funds.... Corporations and individual recipients
would each have to pay a 35 percent excise tax on excessive compensation. For
nonretention bonuses, such as those for performance or an annual year-end bonus, the
same tax rates would apply, but it would apply to all amounts over $50,000.").
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flashing. And anyone thinking about doing this, we say you just pay
your dues to the IRS because we're going to be watching this.
Mr. Speaker, we're not trying to punish anybody, we just say do
what you have to do. Rewards are subjective, but you don't do it with
259taxpayers' money.
c. Deduction vs. Voluntary Repayment
In the context of Section 1341, many cases have held that if the agree-
ment to repay part of compensation was entered into after the year in
which the compensation had been paid, no deduction was allowed in year
one on the grounds that the repayment was voluntary. 260 Similarly, the
Crellin's Estate line of payback in year one authorities use the term
"voluntary" (hence the original payment is not excludible and the repay-
ment is non-deductible) where the original obligation of payment did not
contain a condition subsequent and the repayment was instead required by
a second contract.261 "Voluntary" is shorthand for repayments "which
clearly ha[ve] no legitimate business purpose but rather serve[] tax manip-
ulation ends." 262 Those cases involved closely held corporations where a
suit for performance was unlikely.263 For example, where a shareholder
259. 155 Cong. Rec. H3656 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 2009) (remarks of Charles Rangel, H.
Ways & Means Comm. Chair, D-N.Y.); accord 155 CONG. REc. H4303 (daily ed. Apr. 1,
2009) (remarks of Rep. Melissa Bean, D-Ill.) ("[L]ike many of our colleagues and
constituents, we were outraged by bonuses paid to those who brought down AIG and the
economy along with it."); id. H4276-77 (remarks of Rep. Steve Cohen, D-Tenn.).
Misuse of TARP money which was to unfreeze the credit markets included: junkets,
bought up baby banks, paying bonuses expressly prohibited by the TARP bill, and
counter payments to foreign banks who had bet the subprime mortgages would crater.
155 CONG. REc. H4280 (daily ed. Apr. 1, 2009) (remarks of Rep. Sheila Jackson-Lee, D-
Tex.); 155 CoNG. REc. H4000 (daily ed. Mar. 25, 2009) (remarks of Rep. Duncan
Hunter, R-Cal.); 155 CONG. REc. H4287 (daily ed. Apr. 1, 2009) (remarks of Rep. Alan
Grayson, D-Fla.).
260. See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 35,484 (Sept. 17, 1973); see also I.R.S. Gen.
Couns. Mem. 35,557 (Nov. 8, 1973).
261. Nat'l Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. United States, 244 F. Supp. 135, 138 (M.D.
Tenn. 1965) (explaining Grandview Mines v. Comm'r, 32 T.C. 759 (1959)), affd 385
F.2d 832 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1967); Noble v. Comm'r, 368 F.2d 439, 445 (9th Cir. 1966)
("We find no merit to petitioners' argument that their acts, in the years subsequent to the
year in which the payments were made, did not create a new legal relationship. Their
attempt to distinguish United States v. Simon, supra, and Crellin's Estate v. Comm-
issioner ... on the basis that in those cases there were new legal relationships is not
valid.")
262. Nat'l Life & Accident, 244 F.2d at 138.
263. See Cal-Farm Ins. Co. v. United States, 647 F. Supp. 1083, 1090 (E.D. Cal.
1986).
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and his closely-held corporation cast a transaction as a transfer of corp-
orate assets and upon discovering adverse tax consequences, they recast
the transaction as a sale to the shareholder before year end, the Court of
Claims held that the parties were not restored to the status quo ante (the
shareholder now owned the asset) and rescission was not available. 264 The
Plaintiff presents no evidence that it ever sought legal advice
concerning a possible legal claim against it by Life. Nor does plaintiff
contend that Life ever considered or threatened to bring a lawsuit
against it. Instead, plaintiff argues that the payments, though voluntary,
were necessary since their primary purpose was to repair or improve
business relations, citing Harold L. Jenkins, para. 83,667 T.C.M. (P-
H)(1983) (taxpayer, country singing star Conway Twitty, voluntarily
repaid investors in his failed 'Twitty Burger' venture in order to protect
his professional reputation); M.L. Eakes Co., para. 81,429 T.C.M. (P-
H)(1981) (taxpayer voluntarily repaid trade creditors of a related
corporation in order to obtain credit for itself); C. Doris H. Pepper, 36
T.C. 886 (1961) (taxpayer attorneys voluntarily reimbursed parties who
had invested in their client's fraudulent scheme in order to protect their
firm's reputation); Snow v. Commissioner, 31 T.C. 585 (1958) (pay-
ments by law partnership to support a savings and loan association
which generated legal fees for the firm); L. Heller and Son, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 12 T.C. 1109 (1949) (payments by jeweler to creditors
of bankruptcy subsidiary in order to improve credit-rating). In each of
these cases the taxpayers made voluntary payments to third parties
when the existence of the obligations threatened existing business
relations and the taxpayers' reputations.
The circumstances surrounding the plaintiffs payments to its
subsidiary are distinguishable from those in the cited cases. In the cited
cases, the taxpayers made payments to third parties with whom they
dealt at arm's length, whereas in the present case the boards of directors
of the two companies are composed of the same persons; thus, plaintiff
was essentially repairing business relations with itself.
Id. "In this case, there is no evidence of a legal obligation on the part of plaintiff to repay
its subsidiary; instead, the court has already concluded that it was motivated by a sub-
jective belief concerning the necessity of repayment." Id. at 1092. Thus, Section 1341
was unavailable.
264. Blanco v. United States, 602 F.2d 324 (Ct. Cl. 1979). In Blanco, taxpayers sought
to "undo a completed transaction within the same taxable year in order to avoid the
originally unforeseen tax consequences of that transaction." Id. at 324. The court found
that the facts did not support the taxpayers' claim that they rescinded the transaction at
issue. Id. at 327. In "a rescission, the parties are restored to their respective positions
prior to the transaction. That was not done in this case." Id. The court noted that "a
taxpayer may not reopen and alter a transaction that was valid and complete for business
purposes in order to obtain more favorable tax treatment, even though initially he could
have cast the transaction in the altered mold." Id. "Although in the second transaction the
taxpayer issued a note in order to recast the first transaction as a sale of assets, the second
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Tax Court has held that where a payback agreement is entered into after
payment is made, Section 1341 is unavailable: "[A] restoration agreement
voluntarily executed after an item has been received does not establish that
the 'taxpayer did not have an unrestricted right to such item."' 265 The
Service has, on occasion, distinguished claim of right payback from
Section 162 payback, but usually has not.
266
The better analysis is that even a voluntary payment by an employee
may be deductible as an ordinary and necessary business expense of being
a corporate executive267 if his or her intent is to "prevent injury to the
taxpayer's business reputation ' 268 or preserve his or her job.269 "It is now
transaction was not designed to accomplish a sale of assets. The sale was merely the
means of achieving the admitted end of avoiding taxation." Id. at 328.
265. Pahl v. Comm'r, 67 T.C. 286, 291 (1976).
According to the circumstances, terms, and conditions of the original
payments of director's fees to petitioner, petitioner was never obligated
at any time to return any portion of said fees to the corporation. It was
only after petitioner received the director's fees that he voluntarily
entered into the repayment contract which may or may not have been
binding upon him. However, the fact that the contract may have been
binding upon petitioner does not change the essentially voluntary
nature of his decision to enter into it. Since a restoration agreement
voluntarily executed after an item has been received does not establish
that the 'taxpayer did not have an unrestricted right to such item' within
the meaning of section 1341(a), that section will not support a 1972
section 165 loss deduction for the amounts repaid by petitioner.
Id. at 290-91.
266. See Oswald v. Comm'r, action on dec., No. 6301-66, 1968 AOD LEXIS 327
(Aug. 20, 1968). But see I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 33,602 (Aug. 25, 1967) ("It has long
been recognized that any party who restores funds that he initially received and held
under a claim of right will thereby become entitled to take a business expense deduction
for the year in which the repayment transaction is actually carried out.... Also directly
pertinent here is Rev. Rul. 64-224, C.B. 1964-2, 52 whereby the Service has expressly
conceded the deductibility, as ordinary and necessary business expenses, of all amounts
which convicted violators of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act pay or incur in satisfaction of
private claims for treble damages under section 4 of the Clayton Act.").
267. Being an employee constitutes a trade or business for Section 162(a), separate and
apart from the performance of services for an existing employer and rather than, or in
addition to, the trade or business of holding a particular job. See Primuth v. Comm'r, 54
T.C. 374, 377 (1970) (trade or business of being corporate executive or manager), acq. in
result, 1972-2 C.B. 2; Rev. Rul. 75-120, 1975-1 C.B. 55 (considered in I.R.S. Gen.
Couns. Mem. 35,919 (July 29, 1974)).
268. Mitchell v. Comm'r, 73 F.3d 628, 631 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding payment was
clearly a stock acquisition cost and hence had to be capitalized).
269. Gould v. Comm'r, 64 T.C. 132, 136 (1975).
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well-settled that voluntary expenditures that are made to preserve or
protect one's business reputation are deductible. 27 °
It has been held that a voluntary payment is not deductible as an
ordinary and necessary expense. Nevertheless, the courts ... have often
supported the general proposition that voluntary expenditures may
qualify as ordinary and necessary business expenses if they are made to
prevent injury to the taxpayer's business, or to preserve and protect the
goodwill of the business. The Service has stated that voluntary
expenditures made to protect, promote, and preserve one's business are
deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses.
Deductible voluntary expenditures can be made to protect the
taxpayer's general business or commercial reputation, or they can be
made to protect the taxpayer's goodwill among its creditors, and
customers. The expenditures however, must be made to preserve
goodwill, since expenditures made to acquire goodwill are capital
expenditures.... Moreover, on occasion the Service has argued the
purported expenditures were really gifts.
Although we agree with the general legal proposition that expend-
itures to preserve goodwill are deductible business expenses, we also
note the courts have required a showing that the expenditures were
likely or necessary to preserve goodwill.27'
Although members of Congress 272 and the then CEO of AG1273 want to
refer to repayments of bonuses by executives as giving back the bonuses,
they clearly were not voluntary in the sense of non-business. The House
270. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,649 (Aug. 25, 1978) (citing sources).
271. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,560 (Jan. 21, 1976) (citations omitted); see also
I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,384 (Jan. 19, 1978).
272. See supra note 259 and accompanying text; see also 155 Cong. Rec. H3659
(daily ed. Mar. 19, 2009) (remarks of Rep. Danny Davis, D-Ill.) ("[W]here I live on Main
Street in America, if you get something that you didn't deserve, or if you get something
that was unwarranted, you either give it back or it's taken back. It's my position that
these bonuses were unwarranted, not deserved. If they are not going to give them back,
then we are going to take them back."); id. at H3664 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 2009) (remarks
of Rep. Sheila Jackson-Lee, D-Tex.) ("I rise today with pitchfork in hand to take back
from the executives at AIG, monies that rightfully belong to the taxpayers of this
country.... Edward M. Liddy, the chief executive of AIG-selected in consultation with
the Treasury Department after the first large infusion of government assistance-testified
before a House Financial Services subcommittee that he has called on employees who
received in excess of $100,000 to give back at least half of their bonuses, but which he
also said are a legal obligation of the company.").
273. House AIG Hearing, supra note 4, at 54 (statement of Edward Liddy, CEO, AIG)
("I have asked those who received retention payments in excess of $100,000 or more to
return at least half of those payments. Some have already stepped forward and offered to
give up 100 percent of their payments.").
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Bill refers to "waiver or return of payments."274 "Asked if the [House]
legislation [taxing at 90% unreturned bonuses paid to executives by TARP
beneficiaries] had its intended effect, House Ways and Means Committee
Chairman Charles Rangel (D-N.Y.) said, 'Do you think they would have
done this voluntarily? Come on."' 275 In short, an AIG executive would be
repaying the 2009 bonus to preserve his or her business reputation and,
hence, could deduct the repayment as an employee business expense.
What if the AIG executive pays back the "retention" bonus after he has
left AIG? If the employee, shortly after leaving AIG, becomes an emp-
loyee with similar duties in another firm, then the repayment also would
be deductible as an ordinary and necessary expense of protecting his or her
existing reputation as a corporate executive. 276 Similarly, the payment
274. Taxing Executive Bonuses Paid By Companies Receiving TARP Assistance,
H.R. 1586, 111 th Cong. (2009).
Waiver or return of payments. Such term shall not include any amount
if the employee irrevocably waives the employee's entitlement to such
payment, or the employee returns such payment to the employer, before
the close of the taxable year in which such payment is due. The
preceding sentence shall not apply if the employee receives any benefit
from the employer in connection with the waiver or return of such
payment.
Id. § 1(b)(2)(C).
275. Heather M. Rothman & Brett Ferguson, Executive Compensation Punitive Bonus
Tax Bill on Back Burner As Some Money Returned, Lawmakers Say, DAILY TAX REPORT
(BNA) No. 55 at G-1 (Mar. 25, 2009); 155 Cong. Rec. H3656 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 2009)
(remarks of Charles Rangel, Chair H.Comm. Ways & Means, D-N.Y.) ("At the end of the
day, I do hope that this will be a message that will be sent in a bipartisan way. We may
have differences in how we resolve this problem in the future, but this problem is there,
and we are saying to the IRS and to the commissioner that we really want to make certain
that, at the end of the day, they're not the ones that caused the problem and then get
rewarded for it."); id. at H3659 (Remarks of Rep. Bob Ethridge, D-N.C., Member, H.
Comm. on Ways and Means) ("If AIG will not halt these bonuses, and if its employees
will not voluntarily turn them down, then this bill will ensure that the money is returned
to the taxpayers. I regret having to use the tax code in this manner, but the blatant abuse
of taxpayer dollars by AIG leaves us with no other choice. This bill will send a message
not only to AIG, but to other companies receiving taxpayer aid that this behavior is
unacceptable."); see also 155 Cong. Rec. H4264-65 (daily ed. Apr. 1, 2009) (remarks of
Rep. Roy Blunt, R-Mo.) Congress sent a message with the bonus claw back legislation.
"[T]he AIG executives apparently got the message, because many of them have returned
the bonus money back to the taxpayers." Id.
276. Cf Gerhard v. Comm'r, 29 T.C.M. (CCH) 1153 (1970). A taxpayer terminated
his employment as general manager with a North Carolina firm on January 18, 1967. Id.
At some time prior to February 27, 1967, he moved from North Carolina to Wisconsin,
where he obtained employment with another firm as controller. Id. The Service allowed a
deduction for taxpayer's payment of $52 in March 1967 to an employment agency under
Revenue Ruling 60-223, 1960-1 C.B. 57. Id.
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would be deductible if paid during a short (e.g., not more than one year)
"hiatus" during which the former employee is unemployed but is still
actively seeking employment in a job in the same trade or business.
277
Judge Tannenwald stated in his concurring opinion in Primuth v.
Commissioner that "[i]n cases of the instant type, I would adopt the simple
test of comparing the position which the taxpayer occupied before and after
the change. Perhaps the categorization of corporate executive will not
always be applicable, but, in this case, petitioner was at all times afinancial
corporate executive. 278
The Tax Court in one of the Primuth progeny elaborated that "[i]f
substantial differences exist in the tasks and activities of various occu-
pations or employments, then each such occupation or employment con-
stitutes a separate trade or business. '' 279 Furthermore, "the Tax Court has
adopted a 'commonsense' or functional approach, holding that whenever
additional licenses, new skills or more discretionary responsibilities are
required in the new employment, a taxpayer has entered a new trade or
business."
280
The deductible education cost regulation28 1 has been a useful rule ofthumb in making this determination.
277. Rev. Rul. 75-120, 1975-1 C.B. 55; see also Primuth v. Comm'r, 54 T.C. 374, 378
(1970) ("[Ilt is possible for an employee to retain, at least temporarily, his status of carrying
on his own trade or business independent of receiving any compensation from a particular
employer."); cf. Ford v. Comm'r, 56 T.C. 1300, 1306-07 (1971) (education costs), aff'd
per curiam, 487 F.2d 1025 (9th Cir. 1973); Furner v. Comm'r, 393 F.2d 292 (7th Cir.
1968) (same). The Tax Court has found hiatus periods of even longer than a year to be
temporary. See Haft v. Comm'r, 40 T.C. 2 (1963) (four years); Hitt v. Comm'r, 37
T.C.M. (CCH) 333 (1978) (three years); Sherman v. Comm'r, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1191
(1977) (two years).
278. Primuth, 54 T.C. at 382.
279. Davis v. Comm'r, 65 T.C. 1014, 1019 (1976).
280. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,320 (Nov. 14, 1977). The Second Circuit described
the Tax Court as insisting "on a high degree of identity in deciding the issue of
sameness." Estate of Rockefeller v. Comm'r, 762 F.2d 264, 268 (2d Cir. 1985).
281. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(3) (2009).
(3) Qualification for new trade or business. (i) The second category of
nondeductible educational expenses within the scope of subparagraph
(1) of this paragraph are expenditures made by an individual for
education which is part of a program of study being pursued by him
which will lead to qualifying him in a new trade or business. In the case
of an employee, a change of duties does not constitute a new trade or
business if the new duties involve the same general type of work as is
involved in the individual's present employment. For this purpose, all
teaching and related duties shall be considered to involve the same
general type of work.
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That regulation, adopted to test the deductibility of educational expenses,
provides in relevant part that in the case of an employee, a change of
duties does not constitute a new trade or business if the new duties
involve the same general type of work as is involved in the individual's
present employment.
282
The harder question is whether an executive returning the bonus and
quitting employment with AIG, who is now self-employed and not looking
for a similar job with another firm, may deduct the repayment to the TARP
benefitted firm. At first blush, this is the classic Welch v. Helvering283 fact
pattern. There, the taxpayer paid portions of claims discharged in the
bankruptcy of a corporation in order to re-establish business relations with
the corporation's former customers who had held those claims, whom he
had known when acting for the corporation, and for whom he now sought
individually to purchase from him on a commission in order to "solidify
his credit and standing." 284 The Court held that the payments to the credi-
tors were necessary for the "development" of the taxpayer's business but
"[miany necessary payments are charges upon capital.
Reputation and learning are akin to capital assets, like the good will of
an old partnership.... For many, they are the only tools with which to
hew a pathway to success. The money spent in acquiring them is well
Id.
282. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 35,919 (July 29, 1974) (considering Rev. Rul. 75-120,
1975-1 C.B. 55); see also Estate of Rockefeller, 762 F.2d at 268 & n.5 ("The Tax Court,
with the approval of the courts of appeals, has limited deductibility to cases where the
taxpayer was seeking employment in the same trade or business. Moreover, the courts
have insisted on a high degree of identity in deciding the issue of sameness.... Most of
these cases concerned education expenses, as to which there is a regulation, Treas. Reg. §
1.162-5 (1960). This elaborates on the statute by defining a specific type of deductible
expenses, § 1.162-5(a)(2), and by prohibiting the deduction of expenses incurred in order
to attain minimum educational requirements for a position, § 1.162-5(b)(2), and expenses
for a program of study leading to qualification in a new trade or business, § 1.162-
5(b)(3). However, the Tax Court cites education cases in decisions regarding other types
of expenses incurred in obtaining a new position."). "If substantial differences exist in the
tasks and activities of various occupations or employments, then each such occupation or
employment constitutes a separate trade or business." Davis, 65 T.C. at 1019. I.R.S. Gen.
Couns. Mem. 37,320 (Nov. 14, 1977) (considering Rev. Rul. 78-93, 1978-1 C.B. 38)
("Section 1.162-5(b)(3) of the regulations further provides that a change of duties does
not constitute a new trade or business if the new duties involve the same general type or
work as is involved in the taxpayer's present employment.").
283. 290 U.S. 111 (1933).
284. Id. at 112.
285. Id. at 113.
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and wisely spent. It is not an ordinary expense of the operation of a
286business.
Conti v. Commissioner287 shows that the key issue in this context is
"drawing a line between expenditures to preserve and protect business
reputation and those which improve and develop good will. ' 288 At the time
of Welch, courts were just beginning to hold that a corporate executive
could be in a trade or business of being an employee as to deductible
expenditures. 289 Even almost four decades after Welch, the conventional
wisdom was that a corporate executive's trade or business was limited to
performing services just for his or her present employer. 290 As discussed
above, that rigid line was erased by Primuth.291 The focus became whether
the taxpayer was seeking the general type or work as was involved in his
or her present employment with no additional skill or training needed and
no substantial differences in the tasks and activities.292 Employment and
self-employment meeting such continuity should be a continuation of the
same trade or business and thus support current deduction of expenditures
incurred to preserve the former executive's business reputation, even
where he or she is now self-employed. One can easily imagine the ques-
tion of job-seeking expenditures incurred by a terminated senior associate
who ends up self-employed (and perhaps taking a portfolio of clients with
him).
Assuming that the bonus repayments are deductible by former exec-
utives, the problems just begin. The tax results of a deduction are not
286. Id. at 115-16.
287. 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 348 (1972).
288. Id. ("[W]e hold that petitioner's expenditure of $488,464.89 in 1964 was proxi-
mately related to his business activities and was made to preserve and protect his business
reputation in order to enable him to continue to carry on such activities.... Consequently,
he is entitled to a deduction in that amount under section 162(a).").
289. The early history of this principle is ably recounted in the landmark case, Trent v.
Comm'r, 291 F.2d 669, 671-75 (2d Cir. 1961).
290. Primuth v. Comm'r, 54 T.C. 374, 384 (1970) (Tietjens, J., dissenting) ("I would
say the taxpayer was in the business of being an employee of Foundry when the claimed
deductible expenses were incurred. The expenses, however, were not related to his
employment by Foundry but were paid to obtain a new job with another employer. To me
this is the same as incurring expenses in locating or finding a new business."); I.R.S. Gen.
Couns. Mem. 35,919 (July 29, 1974) (considering Rev. Rul. 75-120, 1975-1 C.B. 55)
("[T]he long standing position of the Service has been that expenses incurred by employ-
ees in seeking and actually securing new employment are deductible as ordinary and
necessary business expenses, but that expenses incurred in seeking but not securing new
employment are not deductible.").
291. See supra note 278.
292. See supra notes 279-82 and accompanying text.
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comparable to rescission of the bonus and return to the status quo ante or
year end netting described above, as to the former executive who remains
in employee status seeking another executive position or is employed as
an executive by a different employer. The repayment would constitute a
"miscellaneous itemized deduction" which is reduced by an amount equal
to 2% of AG1293 and which would be greatly increased by the retention
bonus. A substantial repayment deduction would impact the phase-out of
itemized deductions in general, of which the repayment deduction would
surely be the greatest, (roughly by one third of 2% of AGI above a comp-
areatively low floor for 2009,2 94 and the phase-out of personal exemptions
under Section 151.) That is just on the income tax side. The heavy impact
would be under the Alternative Minimum Tax since no "miscellaneous
itemized deduction" is a deduction in computing alternative minimum
taxable income. 295 Thus, the bonus would be included in alternative mini-
mum taxable income for 2009, but the 2009 repayment would not be de-
ductible. The AMT rate for most of these executives would probably be
28%.296 Finally it does not appear that the repayment would reduce the
wages subject to the Medicare tax.
CONCLUSION
As discussed above,2 97 the ideal solutions are for Congress and the
Service to specifically address repayment of retention bonuses to TARP
recipients in the year of receipt of the retention bonus, or in the subsequent
year-with rescission in the first case and a Section 1341 deduction in the
second. Such solutions should be expressly based on the controversy at the
time of payment of the bonus so that it was not received under an absolute
claim of right, but instead was subject to a condition subsequent. Because
this has not been done promptly, only a handful of AIG Financial Products
executives in the top twenty five of AIG employees remain who have made
the repayment pledge.298 So who is the sucker now? Arguably those who
made the pledge are suckers, not because the original retention bonus, to the
extent repaid, is not excludible in 2009 nor deductible under section 1341 if
the retention bonus was paid in 2008, but because most of their colleagues
293. I.R.C. § 67 (2006).
294. Id. § 68.
295. Id. § 56(b)(1)(a)(i).
296. Id. § 55(b)(1)(A)(i).
297. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
298. See supra note 18.
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who made the pledge kept the money and ran. The even bigger suckers are
members of Congress who believed the problem was solved by the pledges.
What is to be done now? Neither Congress nor the Service addressed
the retention bonuses in 2009. But the problem has not gone away, "AIG is
scheduled to pay out an additional $198 million to employees in March
[2010]. ' '299 Pay Tsar, Feinberg's Proposed Compensation Payments and
Structures would preclude payment of any 2009 retention bonus in 2010 to
AIG's Financial Products employees. 300 AIG Financial Products executives,
however, are threatening to leave en mass if they do not receive their
retention bonuses in March 2010.301 Europe may not be a haven for such
traders since England plans to force banks to pay a 50% tax on bonuses
above $40,700302 with France and Germany likely to follow suit.30 3 Havens
with other financial institutions should be reviewed as well.
Goldman Sachs is reported to have said that its top executives will
forgo cash bonuses, instead being paid in long-term stock.3°4 Furthermore,
the Federal Reserve, contemporaneous with the Pay Tsar's proposals,
proposed principles designed to discourage pay packages that may encour-
age risky practices. 30 5 If financial institutions fail to promptly adopt pay
299. See Dennis, supra note 18.
300. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
301. See Sherman, supra note 18; Florence Olsen, Rep. Frank Previews Issues for Jan.
22 Hearing on Financial Industry Pay, 8 DAILY TAX REP. GG-2 (Jan. 14, 2010).
The hearing will examine arguments made by the financial services
industry that regulating compensation will cause an exodus of valuable
employees from the financial services industry to other U.S. industries or
to foreign companies. "It's time to get those arguments aired," Frank
said. '"There may be, in some of these financial institutions, people
capable of playing major league baseball, but I'm not aware of any," he
added. "But absent that, I don't know where they would go to get
comparable forms of compensation."
Id.
302. Landon Thomas, Executive at Barclays Defends Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2009;
David Jolly, France Confident it Can Tax and Retain Bankers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/13/business/global/13bonus.html; Gaelle Faure & Henry
Chu, France Plans Tax on Bank Bonuses, L.A. TIMEs, Dec. 17, 2009, at A-38; David
Francis, Obama Can Put Brakes on Big Bank Bonuses, CHRISTIAN SCI. MoNrroR (Jan. 18,
2010) (discussing how France and Britain have moved to tax 2009 bank bonuses); Rick
Mitcheli, Lagarde Says France Expects Bonus Tax on Bankers to Raise 360 Million Euros,
7 DAILY TAX REP. 1-2 (Jan. 13, 2010).
303. Louise Story, Goldman Sachs Bars Cash Bonus For Top Officers, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 11, 2009, at Bus. Al; Editorial, Taming the Fat Cats, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2009, at
A6.
304. Id.
305. Proposed Guidance on Sound Incentive Compensation Policies, 74 Fed. Reg.
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structures along these lines, Congress should either force their adoption or
impose a hefty excise tax on large cash bonuses.
The time is ripe. In a Time Magazine poll conducted shortly after
Goldman announced its blockbuster bonuses, only 18% of respondents
thought "large Wall Street financial institutions learned from their mis-
takes," while a whopping 75% believed that "business as usual" would
prevail.3 °6 More ominously for Goldman, 62% of respondents said the
government should strictly limit pay at Wall Street firms, "regardless of
whether or not they've paid back the government." 30 7 As the New York
Times reported, Wall Street pay is a focus of many in Washington and
"[t]he Obama administration wants to tax it. The Federal Reserve wants to
tweak it. And the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation wants to shape
it.,,308
55,227, 55,231 (proposed Oct. 27, 2009)
To be consistent with safety and soundness, incentive compensation
arrangements at a banking organization should: Provide employees in-
centives that do not encourage excessive risk-taking beyond the organi-
zation's ability to effectively identify and manage risk; Be compatible
with effective controls and risk management; and Be supported by
strong corporate governance, including active and effective oversight
by the organization's board of directors.
Id.
306. John Paul Rollert, Goldman Sachs Bonuses: More than Just Bad PR, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR (Dec. 18, 2009); October 26-27 Survey, TIME MAG., available at
www.srbi.com/Wall%20Street%2OQuestionaire%29Poll%2OResults.pdf.
307. See October 26-27 Survey, supra note 306.
308. Eric Dash, Wall St. Pay is a Focus of Many in Washington, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13,
2010, at B-1. At this time the Obama Administration was reluctant to tax the banking
executives directly on their bonuses, but preferred instead to tax the big banks directly on
risks that they are taking by subtracting from total assets common stock and FDIC
insured deposits (with the hoped for results that these banks will reduce bonuses and lend
the savings to borrowers to reduce risks and the tax). Cheryl Bolen & Jay S. Heffin,
Obama Unveils New Tax on Banks to Mitigate "Excesses" of Wall Street, 9 DAILY TAX
REP. GG-3 (Jan. 15, 2009); Jay S. Hefrin, Frank Backs Idea of Bank Penalty, 7 DAILY
TAX REP. G-5 (Jan. 13, 2010).
